Co-evolutionary Strategies for an Alternating-Offer Bargaining Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we apply an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) to solve the Rubinstein’s Basic AlternatingOffer Bargaining Problem, and compare our experimental results with its analytic game-theoretic solution. The application of EA employs an alternative set of assumptions on the players’ behaviors. Experimental outcomes suggest that the applied co-evolutionary algorithm, one of Evolutionary Algorithms, is able to generate convincing approximations of the theoretic solutions. The major advantages of EA over the game-theoretic analysis are its flexibility and ease of application to variants of Rubinstein Bargaining Problems and complicated bargaining situations for which theoretic solutions are unavailable.
منابع مشابه
Using Evolutionary Algorithms to study Bargaining Problems
The objective of this research is to tackle bargaining problems with Evolutionary Algorithms (EA). EA have been proved effective for a wide variety of problems. In this paper, we apply EA to solve Rubinstein’s Basic Alternating-Offer Bargaining Problem whose game-theoretic solution is known. Experimental outcomes suggest that EA are able to generate convincing approximations of the theoretic so...
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