Disquotation, Conditionals, and the Liar
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper I respond to Jacquette’s criticisms, in (Jacquette, 2008), of my (Barker, 2008). In so doing, I argue that the Liar paradox is in fact a problem about the disquotational schema, and that nothing in Jacquette’s paper undermines this diagnosis.
منابع مشابه
Liar Paradox and Substitution into Intensional Contexts
John Barker, in two recent essays, raises a variety of intriguing criticisms to challenge my interpretation of the liar paradox and the type of solution I propose in ‘Denying the Liar’ and ‘Denying the Liar Reaffirmed.’ Barker continues to believe that I have misunderstood the logical structure of the liar sentence and its expression, and that as a result my solution misfires. I shall try to sh...
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