Non-Technical Interoperability in Multinational Forces

Interoperability in multinational forces generally refers to compatibility of hardware and software. Connectivity alone, however, does not confer capability and must be accompanied by interoperability of people, process, and organisation. We have labelled these latter aspects ‘nontechnical interoperability’ (NTI). The purpose of this item of work was to develop a valid framework describing the factors that underpin NTI to allow UK MOD to understand these aspects of interoperability better and to mitigate potential frictional factors in multinational forces. Recent work has involved an assessment of the framework by military subject matter experts to validate its structure and content further. In addition, a Multinational forces Co-operability Index has been developed with a view to aiding the assessment of whole-system interoperability. Background The period since 1990 has seen increasing attention paid to multinational military forces. Experiences in the Arabian Gulf and the former Yugoslavia have demonstrated the substantial strategic advantages to be gained through coalition and alliance operations. Operating in multinational forces is nothing new for the British Armed Forces. For example, as Connaughton [1] points out, as far back as the early Eighteenth Century, it was rare for the Duke of Marlborough to undertake a campaign with more than 50% of his forces drawn from the United Kingdom. It is interesting to note then, that recent commentators, for example Palin [2], have observed that multinational forces raise a new set of challenges for the military personnel involved. There are at least two reasons for this in the period since the end of the cold war. On the one hand, the level in the military hierarchy at which regular multinational interaction takes place has lowered. For example, the British Army of the Rhine would typically have co-ordinated with its allies at Corps or Division level. Nowadays, multinationality occurs within Brigades. In addition, there is the challenge of operating with unfamiliar nations. Compared to the certainties of the NATO alliance, where trust could be built over a number of years, the UK is likely to operate in ad hoc coalitions with non-traditional partners. Multinational commanders are likely to inherit ‘coalitions of the willing’, designed to meet political-strategic, rather than operational and tactical, requirements. In order for an alliance or coalition to operate effectively, it is essential that national contingents can achieve as high a degree of interoperability as is possible. NATO doctrine stresses that interoperability is: “the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, and forces and to use these services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together” [3]. Interoperability has generally been taken to imply the compatibility of different contingents’ military hardware and software, for example, weapons systems or communication and information systems. More recently, however, it has been recognised that this ‘technological interoperability’, while essential, cannot, in isolation, ensure the capability of the multinational force [4]. Connectivity alone does not confer capability. The command and control element of a military force can be characterised as a complex socio-technical system [5] where personnel, processes, procedures, and organisational structures interact with technology to deliver capability. Clearly, in an alliance or coalition environment, interoperability of technology must be accompanied by interoperability of people, process, and organisation in order that a combined military capability can be achieved. We have labelled these latter aspects ‘nontechnical interoperability’ (NTI). 1 This term appears to have first been used by Clark and Moon [10]. Friction in Multinational Forces There are a number of potential inefficiencies associated with low NTI. As Van Creveld [6] suggested, low NTI can result in Clausewitzian ‘friction’ in any complex military organisation whether joint, combined, or both [7]. US Marine Corps Doctrine makes a useful distinction between frictional factors that are external to the force, for example enemy action or the weather, and those that are located internally, for example poor co-ordination and complex command relationships. Our studies have focussed specifically on non-technical frictions that manifest themselves within multinational forces. Van Creveld suggested that “the friction within a machine human or mechanical increases in proportion to the number of its parts”. We have respectfully sought to refocus and extend this metaphor. It is our contention that it is the quality of fit between those parts in combination with the number that determines the degree of friction generated. This quality of fit is largely a product of interoperability, both technical and non-technical. Friction within a multinational force implies a reduction in the efficiency of the command and control capability of that force. These performance decrements may manifest themselves in a variety of ways, for example poor planning and decision making or an inability to achieve coordination of effects. Commentators such as Kiszely [8] have observed that the frictions generated within multinational forces have the potential to result in ‘tempo drag’. This potential restriction in the ability to generate tempo may be a particular danger to those forces that, in recent years, have focussed on smaller, lighter units that achieve operational advantage through manoeuvre and the ability to achieve and control operational tempo. Development of a Non-Technical Interoperability Framework Study Aims. In order to operate effectively in a multinational force, it is essential first to understand, and second, where possible, to intervene to mitigate factors with the potential to engender friction. The purpose of this item of work was, therefore, to develop a practical, valid, framework describing the factors that underpin NTI with the intention of supporting future commanders. This paper briefly summarises the output of studies carried out by CHS QinetiQ and its collaborators at Dstl and Vega to derive and exploit a valid baseline of the main non-technical challenges associated with working in multinational forces. These studies were funded under the UK MOD’s Corporate and Applied Research Programmes. It is stressed that it is not an aim of this work to make value judgements or criticisms regarding different nations’ approaches. Rather the purpose of the research is to identify sources of incompatibility with a view to raising awareness of these issues and, where possible, to make recommendations as to how they might better be managed. Moreover, it has not been an aim of this work to document specific differences between individual nations. The aim at this stage has been to produce a framework of generic factors representing continua upon which national contingents might vary. Review and interview study. The overall aim of the work described in this paper was to identify non-technical factors that have the potential to undermine optimal interworking in multinational forces. During the initial phase of this work, a scoping study [9] and a wide-ranging document search and review were conducted. Based on the findings of this early work, a series of interviews were conducted with personnel who had previous experience of working in multinational forces. A semi-structured interview template was developed with the intention of guiding participants in some areas, but also allowing them an opportunity to raise topics they believed to be important, and not to 2 Clausewitz observed that “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction”. 3 This having been said, we should remember that multinational forces are likely to be susceptible to a range of external frictions, not least attempts by red forces to undermine and break cohesion in coalitions and alliances. These issues were outwith the remit of the current studies. be constrained by set questions. 45 interviews were conducted. Participants, who were mostly British officers, had either served in multinational operations (e.g. Bosnia, the Gulf, Sierra Leone, Kosovo) or had worked in a multinational setting (e.g. HQ ARRC). All three services were represented in the study and personnel ranged in rank from Army Captain to 3* General. The majority of interviews lasted over an hour. By far the majority of participants held the rank of Major / Lieutenant Colonel or service equivalent. Interviews were taped for later analysis in conjunction with interviewers’ field notes. This initial analysis identified a wide range of issues as important, for example incompatibilities in national and military–technical language, differences in command styles between contingents, lack of preparation of personnel, and attitudes to information sharing. Structuring these ‘soft’ issues presented a challenge, however, owing to the myriad of linkages between the factors identified. Clearly a framework was important to enable the exploitation of the baseline findings. Related work. The second major phase of the work was aimed at organising the large and complex set of information generated by the interview and review studies into a coherent framework. The literature review revealed that other research teams were engaged in similar work, notably Australia’s DSTO [4,10]. Clark and Moon [10] attempted to provide a valid and comprehensive toolkit for interoperability assessment by coupling the pre-existing US DOD Levels of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI) model [11] with an Organisational Interoperability Maturity model (OIM) developed at DSTO by Clark and Jones [4]. Whereas the LISI model can be used to underpin assessment of technical interoperability, the OIM was developed specifically to provide a means for assessing the organisational factors that contribute to joint and multinational interoperability. The OIM was based on the structure of the LISI model. Five levels of organisational interoperability: Unified, Combined, Collaborative, Ad Hoc, and Independent, were defined. A review of this work suggested that the DSTO model might provide a useful top-level framework for the data captured in our own studies. Thus, the main focus of our analysis became an attempt to overlay the factors identified through the interview and literature review studies onto the four basic attributes of the DSTO model, described below. In this regard, it was noted that the DSTO structure had not been developed ‘bottom up’ from primary data such as interviews, but rather was constructed ‘top down’ based on the expertise of the analysts involved. As such, it was argued that success in this exercise would lend support to the basic structure of the OIM and provide a degree of validation owing to the separate data sets involved. It was further anticipated that, owing to the richness of the data collected in the QinetiQ studies, it might be possible to expand the OIM framework by adding detail and sub-categories to the original high level model. At this stage, it was also decided that the term ‘organisational interoperability’ might be too narrow for the data captured in our interview and review studies. Our work had confirmed that, amongst others, social, personnel, and process factors were as prevalent in the data as organisational issues. For this reason, we decided to name our framework the Non-Technical Interoperability Framework to stress the contribution of the widest possible range of non-technical issues. The non-technical interoperability framework. Clark and Jones [4] proposed 4 enabling attributes of organisational interoperability. These were: Preparedness, Understanding, Command Style, and Ethos. These and their basic definitions were taken as a starting point for the QinetiQ analysis. Issues identified in the earlier interview study were categorised and incorporated into the framework. Following the development of the prototype NTI, two military judgement workshops were run where a small number of subject matter experts, representing the land, air, and maritime environments, were exposed to the framework and invited to comment on its structure and content. A number of changes were made to the framework following those meetings, thus strengthening its claims to validity. The latest iteration of the top-level framework is illustrated in Figure 1. This toplevel structure is described briefly below. The full NTI framework [12] provides a more detailed breakdown of each of the attributes. Preparedness. This attribute refers to how ready a contingent is to interoperate with multinational partners. In the framework, preparedness has been divided into 2 top-level areas: organisational preparedness and the preparedness of personnel. Organisational preparedness mainly relates to the compatibility of structures and processes and includes, TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures), rules of engagement, structure, doctrine, and unit / formation experience. The issue of unit / formation experience is important; clearly there is likely to be less friction within a multinational force where military organisations have collaborated in the past and have, for example, developed common or compatible procedures. Preparedness of personnel focuses on the readiness of the individuals involved to contribute to multinational environments and is based upon selection, training and prior individual experience. The results of a recent survey [13] suggest that previous multinational experience with one nation provides good preparation for later deployments, even where those later deployments involve contact with entirely different contingents. NON-TECHNICAL INTEROPERABILITY* Doctrine Selection / posting policy Tactics, techniques, and procedures Terminology Language