Maximal-Element Rationalizability∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We examine the maximal-element rationalizability of choice functions with arbitrary domains. While rationality formulated in terms of the choice of greatest elements according to a rationalizing relation has been analyzed relatively thoroughly in the earlier literature, this is not the case for maximal-element rationalizability, except when it coincides with greatest-element rationalizability because of properties imposed on the rationalizing relation. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for maximal-element rationalizability by itself, and for maximal-element rationalizability in conjunction with additional properties of a rationalizing relation such as reflexivity, completeness, P -acyclicity, quasitransitivity, consistency and transitivity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification No.: D11.
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