Approximation in Algorithmic Game Theory: Robust Approximation Bounds for Equilibria and Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
1.1. Motivation. Many modern computer science applications involve autonomous, self-interested agents. It is therefore important for us to consider agents' strategic behavior in modelling the problems, where non-cooperative game theory can be very helpful. Unfortunately, as one can expect, strategic behavior of the agents often make full optimality di cult or impossible for various reasons. Three common reasons are the following:
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