Almost Transferable Utility, Changes in Production Possibilities, and the Nash Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Author Contact: Elisabeth Gugl, Dept. of Economics, University of Victoria, P.O. Box 1700, STN CSC, Victoria, B.C., Canada V8W 2Y2; e-mail: [email protected]; Phone: (250) 721-8538; FAX: (250) 721-6214 Abstract Consider a two-person economy in which allocative efficiency is independent of distribution but cardinality of the agents’ utility functions precludes transferable utility. I show that both agents either benefit or lose with any change of production possibilities under the Nash Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions.
منابع مشابه
Bridging the gap between the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions
Bargaining solutions that satisfy weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, and independence of equivalent utility representations are called standard. The Nash (1950) solution is the unique independent standard solution and the KalaiSmorodinsky (1975) solution is the unique monotonic standard solution. Every standard solution satisfies midpoint domination on triangles, or MDT for short. I introduce a ...
متن کاملOn the Relevance of Alternatives in Bargaining: Average Alternative Solutions
We compare bargaining solutions in terms of the relevance of alternatives. We show that most well-known bargaining solutions do not use all the alternatives, but there are numerous bargaining solutions that do. We introduce a new class of bargaining solutions called ``average alternative solutions'', characterize them, and show that the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are limit...
متن کاملEfficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
Roth (1977) axiomatized the Nash (1950) bargaining solution without Pareto optimality, replacing it by strong individual rationality in Nash’s axiom list. In a subsequent work (Roth, 1979) he showed that when strong individual rationality is replaced by weak individual rationality, the only solutions that become admissible are the Nash and the disagreement solutions. In this paper I derive anal...
متن کاملStability, Fairness and Random Walks in the Bargaining Problem
We study the classical bargaining problem and its two canonical solutions, (Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky), from a novel point of view: we ask for stability of the solution if both players are able distort the underlying bargaining process by reference to a third party (e.g. a court). By exploring the simplest case, where decisions of the third party are made randomly we obtain a stable solution, ...
متن کاملAxiomatic characterization of the Nash and Kalai Smorodinsky solutions for discrete bargaining problems
This paper addresses a problem in axiomatic bargaining, which is a natural variation of the classical models of Nash and Kalai Smorodinsky. Departure from the convexity assumption is justi ed by situations where probability mixture of pure outcomes cannot be implemented. Applications of such problems concern integer allocations of a homogeneous product between two agents, and the problem of fai...
متن کامل