On the complexity of undominated core and farsighted solution concepts in coalitional games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we study the computational complexity of solution concepts in the context of coalitional games. Firstly, we distinguish two different kinds of core, the undominated core and excess core, and investigate the difference and relationship between them. Secondly, we thoroughly investigate the computational complexity of undominated core and three farsighted solution concepts—farsighted core, farsighted stable set and largest consistent set.
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