REINHARD SELTEN, ABDOLKARIM SADRIEH and KLAUS ABBINK MONEY DOES NOT INDUCE RISK NEUTRAL BEHAVIOR, BUT BINARY LOTTERIES DO EVEN WORSE
نویسندگان
چکیده
If payoffs are tickets for binary lotteries, which involve only two money prizes, then rationality requires expected value maximization in tickets. This payoff scheme was increasingly used to induce risk neutrality in experiments. The experiment presented here involved lottery choice and evaluation tasks. One subject group was paid in binary lottery tickets, another directly in money. Significantly greater deviations from risk neutral behavior are observed with binary lottery payoffs. This discrepancy increases when subjects have easy access to the alternatives’ expected values and mean absolute deviations. Behavioral regularities are observed at least as often as with direct money payoffs.
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متن کاملReferences Abbink, Klaus, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Shmuel Zamir. 1999. The covered response ultimatum game, UniversitÄat Bonn, SFB discussion paper B-416.
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