Bombs and Missiles: Reinforcers for the Few

The current arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is examined from an applied behavioral perspective. After identifying those behaviors that define the "arms race" two variables are examined that are plausibly related to chang~s in those behaviors, money and the so-called threat from the Soviet Union. An examination of a variety of published sources suggests that (a) weapons producers receive more reinforcers for the manufacture of arms than for civilian goods; (b) the United States government is the principal source of these reinforcers; and (c) the "threat" posed by the Soviet Union rationalizes this allocation of reinforcers, although the evidence indicates that other variables (e.g., competition between the military services , political-economic control by United States based corporations of other countries, etc.) are functionally related to such allocations. Published data reveal the immediate and probable long-term aversive effects on the majority of the world's population. Finally, countercontrolling measures are discussed, with special attention to conditions that potentially weaken countercontrolling efforts. The current threat of nuclear war is a one that endangers the continuationof most life forms on Earth. This threat refers in behavioral terms to changes in the probability of the behaviors of human beings that result in: (1) the increased production and sale of military hardw are in general and nuclear weapons in particular (where production includes research, design and manufacture); (2) increased purchasing of such weapons by government and military representatives; (3) increased deployment of such weapons so that greater numbers of them come under the control of a greater number of behaving humans under ever more variable contingencies of rei.nforcement and punishment; (4) increases in the verbal statements of United States political leaders justifying (i. e., asserting the relevant contingencies for) the production, purchase and deployment of nuclear weapons based on the behaviors of the political leaders of other countries; and (5) increases in the verbal statements of political leaders of the United States, as well as their advisers, identifying the Soviet Union as the source of all international conflict. You will note that this list suggests quantitative changes in only behavior. As behavior analysts we know that. such changes in behavior are only part of the story. The social change agent, and the applied behavior analyst who cares to contribute to su,ch change, will also want to identify those environmental contingencies that have produced, maintained and altered. the probabilities of the behaviors .listed above . Why? Because the end of such an analysis is not m{!rely to understand those behaviors, but to change them. Effective behavior change strategies rest on a clear identification of the environmental antecedents and consequences that affect the probabilities of the behaviors which are of concern . In the present paper I want briefly to examine two environmental events that seem to bear some relationship to the probabilities of the behaviors referred to above. The first of these is money; the· second is the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Literature, film, drama, and religion have all taken note of the relationship between the probability of response and money. Radical behaviorism is no exception in this regard. Money is, as Skinner (1953) wrote, "the generalized reinforcer par excellence because, although 'money won' t buy everything,' it can be exchanged for primary reinforcers of great variety" (p. 79). And although money may not buy "everythi ng," (e. g., immortality), it will certainly buy from weapons producers s.ufficient goods to permanently still the activities of most of the life on this planet. First, I want to present some data with respect to the amount of money involved . Subsequently implications for countercontrol will be drawn in relation to such money for weapons. Looking at the "big picture," the official military budget for 1982-1989 provides $2.6 trillion for the military. (To give some perspective to this figure, note that in the preceding 35 years the U.S. spent a total of only $2.3 trillion on the military [Center for Defense Information, 1984).) Official figures, however, have been shown to seriously underrepresent the actual amount of money spent on the military. Cypher (1981), for example, found that the official figure for national defense in the 1980 budget was $127 billion. This figure, however, failed to take into account actual contractual obligations incurred as well *This is a revised version of a paper delivered as part of the symposium "Preventing Nuclear War: The Role of Behavior Analysis" which was presented at the convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Columbus, Ohio, May 24, 1985. Thanks to Vicki Skeels and Joe Morrow for their critical reading of an earlier draft of this paper. Reprints can be obtained from the author, Department of Psychology, California State University, Sacramento, Sacramento, CA 95819. 26 / Robert G. fensen I BOMBS AND MISSILES as a number of other items related to the military (e. g., the 4.3 million U.S. workers the military employs). Including such data, the actual budget for the military was over $220 billion. The recent debate over the budget revealed similar substantial differences between the official budget request figure, and the actual dollar amount which would be spent. The compromise reached thus far would include an appalling increase of $54 billion in the budget ( an increase of 18%) for fiscal years 1985-1988. Actual spending, however , would jump $61 billion (an increase of 24%). The significance of these figures becomes apparent when the percentage increase proposed by President Reagan for fiscal year 1986 for research and development in the Depart ment of Defense (22%) is compared to the proposed percentage increase for similar purposes in the Department of Health and Human Services (6%) (National Education Association, 1985). Turning to nuclear weapons, the Reagan Administration plans to spend $450 billion from 1984 to 1989, a figure which accounts for nearly one fourth of all military spending in that period. It is important to not e that spending on nuclear weapons has more than doubled since Reagan became President (Center for Defense Information, 1983). Lastly, we come to Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, the so-called Star Wars defense system that the President says will "give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete " (cited in Bethe, Garwin , Gottfried, and Kendall, 1984). There is an estimated $30 billion in the military budget to be spent for the Strategic Defense Initiative over the next five years (Gelb, 1985). Thus, there is first the behavior of poli tical leaders through the allocation of mone y which consequates the behavior of those persons who control the manufacture of nuclear weapons . The budgeting and authorization of enormous amounts of federal dollars for such weapons guarantees their production. The relations hip between these billions and bombs is two-way. On the one hand, there is the obvious relationship between the research and production activities of people and the dollar consequence provided by the government . On the other hand, there are also the behaviors of both political and milita ry officials that are rela ted to the possession of such weap ons, purchased from nuclear weapons manufacturers . With regard to the first aspe ct, I believe that the relationship goes something like this: If there was no money for such things , it is unlikely that they would be built . This relationship has other aspects, however. It is not simply that individuals are paid to have their companies build nuclear missiles, bombs and other military har dware . Ind ividuals wh o own major arms manufacturing companies receive money under certain conditions. One such condition is that of a financially precarious situation for the corporation's owner s. Chrysler Corporation is bu t one case in point. Remember that in the mid-1970's Chrysler Corporation was on the verge of bankruptcy, and received two federal loan guarante es despit e hue and cry from many quarters. What did not reach the public , however , was the fact that Chrysler's rescue was via contracts for military weapons, a contract for tanks which is at present valued at $19 billion (Cypher, 1981). Chrysler is not alone in this regard. In fact, the general relationship is that the demand for military contracts goes up when civilian sales go down: . "military spending functions as a prop to industry, particularly large industry" (Cypher, 1981; p. 14). More recent data reinforce such a conclusion. The New York Times ("Durables Orders," 1985) reports that an increase in orders for durable goods (items expected to last more than three years, e. g., automobiles and washing machines, and which reflect a strengthening of the economy ) was based on an increase in the demand for military goods. A second aspect is the rate of profit for the production of military weapons. In the case of Chrysler, the resulting profit rate from military contracts was 78%, while for civilian work, the profi t rate was negative . Cypher's examination of the political-economy of the arms race shows that Chrysler's spe-, cifics are industry's generality: The rate of profit on military work is on the order of 300% higher than the average received on civilian work. Not only do weapons manufacturers profit from their products, they profit substantially more than for products used by civilians. Additionally, lucrative government contracts are given to but a small number of corporations , thus concentrating the manufacture of weapons, and thus the profits in the hands of very few people. A study recently release d by the Council on Economic Priorities documents such concentra tion in the awarding of contracts for President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"). ("'Star Wars' Contracting," 1985) In sum, a small number of people are reinforced through highly profitable government contracts to produce the weapons that may extinguish life as we know it. Furthermore, government leaders strengthen such a contingency at times when the civilian econom y is in serious need of financial support , i. e., when unemployment continues at an unparalleled rate since the Depression, basic industries (e. g., steel and rubber manu facturing) are being abandoned by their owners, and the national infrastructure is in decline. Apparently there must be more serious considerations for national leaders, which leads us to our next point. The second aspec t of the relationship between money and missiles, viz., the relationship between the possession of such missiles and the behavior of political leaders, is intimately related to the question of the nature of the threat from the Soviet Union. Are not the increases in military spending, the allocations for production of the MX, the Strategic Defense Initiative all designe d principally to defend the United States from the "Evil Empire," which is bent on subjecting us all to an increasing erosion of our civil right s, the disman tling of our industry , increasing intolerance of differences among peoples, etc.? This is obviously rhetorical, but the question remains : What is the function of the verbal behavior of our political leaders vis-avis their demands for more nuclear weapons and the Soviet "threat"? Do these statements abou t the Soviet Union tact the. real world , or are they under the control of other contingencies? One detailed examination of this question is Alan Wo!fe' s 1984 study The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Threat. Wolfe id~ntifies three peaks of U.S. government "hostility " to the Soviet Union. These periods are characterized by an increased frequency of statements describing the Soviet Union as, e. g. , "a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure" (George F. Kennan, cited in Herken, 1982; p . 141). More recently we have been told "Let's not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren' t engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn' t be any hot spots in the world" (President Ronald Reagan, cited in Wolfe, 1984; p. 1-2). Wolfe goes on to demonstrate that contrary to popular belief the military or foreign policy of the Soviet Union is unrelated to the claims of military and political leaders of the United States , which serve as the basis for the renewed arms race. Rather, the verbal behavior of our leaders is more a function of other conditions, e. g., the competition between the military services for a larger proportion of the military budget , changes in economic relationships between the United States and other capitalist countries, etc. Cypher (1981) presents a similar view in this regard. By 1949-1950 the post-World War II economic boom had become transformed into a threatening decline, with predictions of another Great Depression. Faced with such a political-economic crisis, then-President Truman, acting on the recommendations of his advisers, supported a reassessment of both economic and strategic policy on a global level. The State-Defense Policy Review Group which conducted this reassessment proposed significant increases in military spending, both to stimulate the domestic economy, and, as Cypher writes, to "finance the economic recovery of war-tom Europe via military spending in Europe to ensure a broad trading area under U.S. hegemony . This sweep ing change in U.S. policy would be sold to the American people as the means of counteracting the 'Soviet threa t"' (p. 12). Additional data are provided by Fitch (1985) in an examination of the verbal behavior of United States Presidents in State of the Union addresses. Fitch's approach is consistent with that of a behavioral analysis: "In addition to reflecting underlying trends in the external environment, the state of the Union also reflects a . . . response to those trends by the President and his advisers" (p. 33). Fitch's data show a frequency of references by President Reagan, unparalleled since the McCarthy era, to violence and aggression in the context of foreign danger. And, of course, the principal enemy is the Soviet Union. Fitch's explanation of this change in verbal behavior centers on the end of the domestic consensus on anti -communism resulting from the Vietnam War . At the same time, domestic issues (e. g., racism, sexism, environmental degradation) became the focus of increasingly broad-based citizen concern and action. Emphasizing the first aspect, Fitch concluded: ... the lack of domestic consensus in favor of hardline policies in Central America and elsewhere poses a rea l dilemma; either accept the 'loss' of countries perceived to be more directly relevant to U.S. security than Vietnam or intervene to establish a domestic consensus through more active use of propaganda and/or restrictions on dissemination of opposing points of view (p. 42). BOMBS AND MISSILES I Robert G. Jensen I 27 What begins to emerge from these data is a pattern of behavior of political leaders that over many years and independent of political party affiliation , is similar in content, and under the control of similar environmental variables. Whether Republican or Democrat, the "threat" of the Soviet Union becomes more pronounced when issues of international political and economic control intersect domestic pressures for economic and political progress. If the Soviet Union is not the threat that it is purported to be, then a question remains. Paraphrasing Skinner (1953) "The contingencies to be observed in the social environment easily explain the behavior of the arms manufacturer and the government procurer. The problem is to explain the contingencies" (p. 416). That is, the presence (and absence) of which environmental condi tions govern the reinforcing effects of money in relation to the production and possession of nuclear weapons? An answer to such a question requires an examination of those environmental conditions that affect the behavior of political leaders who behave to fashion foreign policy and domestic support for that policy, and the behavior of the politically active heads of corporations who in various ways are the principal factor in the control of the behaviors of political leadership (Domhoff, 1978). Halliday's (1983) incisive study The Making of the Second Cold War identifies changes in environmental events that are plausibly related to the renewed arms race, an arms race that has seen our national capital exchanged for nuclear weapons production with deadly vigor . The first of these changes is an erosion of the superiority of the United States in nuclear weaponry, both quantitatively and technologically. While the U.S. has consistently had more and better weapons than the Soviet Union, and continues in advance of that country, the difference has diminished during the last two decades. (It is interesting to note that even Richard Nixon recognizes this fact. Writing recently in the New York Times, he begins: "In the age of nuclear parity, .. . ") A second critical and related variable is the number of successfu l revolutions that have occurred in the Third World. Spanning the globe from Southern Africa to Central America, these revolutions represent setbacks (i.e., are aversive events) both economically an d politically for those persons whose behavior has been in the past consequated by a high return on investment and agreement on fundamental political positions with the leaders of countries prior to the occurrence of revolutions. The termination of colonialism in Angola, for example, meant that the 150,000 barrels of oil a day drained by Gulf Oil would now serve to bring much needed-capital to the people (for food, new indu stry, medical supplies, etc.) rather than enormous profits to Gulf Oil. And apropos such political agreement is a recent comment by Patrick Buchanan, formerly speech writer for President Nixon, and now White House communications director: "Review the list of the especially despised of the Western liberals in the post-war era: Chiang KaiShek, General Franco, General Batista, President Thieu, Marshal Ky, Lon Nol, the Shah, General Somoza, General Pinochet, Ian Smith, Botha of South Africa, etc. What all these rulers had in common was that they were militantly anti-Communist, proWest, and, in the struggle for the future of mankind, they openly sided with the United States" (cited by Lewis, 1985). 28 I Robert G. Jensen I BOMBS AND MISSILES What Buchanan fails to mention is the other thing that this group has in common: The use of the most aversive means for the .control of their countries' citizens, including assassination, torture, imprisonment, exae, racism, and a variety of economic measures insuring high rates of unemployment, low wages, and inaccessible basic necessities. The que stion one must ask is : who is it tha t benefits from such "anticommunism?" Thus far I have referred only to "the few." One can reasonably argue that, in the catechism of capitalism, "what's good for General Motors is good for America." That is, the benefits of arms production that accrue to the few, also will accrue to the many . Ignoring for now the comment of economist Edward Boorstein ("there is, of course, something else for us to think about in connection with military budget: It could get us all blown up" [1984; p. 25]), an examination of the ''benefits" of the arms race leads to a negative conclusion : A large military budget is a serious drag on economic growth. In their analysis of economic data from industrialized western countries. Cappelen, Gleditsch and Bjerkholt (1984) found less capita l invest ment in civilian indu stry and manufacturing directly related to increasing military budgets. This finding is consistent with data presented earlier in the present paper showing a much higher rate of profit for military vs. civilian production. Additionally , Cappelen et al. show the serious negative impact of military investments on employment. In general the military employs fewer people, i. e., with equal amounts of capital invested in military and civilian production, fewer people are employed in the military sector. In the United States, the effect is as follows: Dur ing the 1977-78 per iod, the military budget averaged only $101.4 billion, well under half what Mr. Reagan proposes for this forthcoming year, and it cost an il,nnual net loss of 1,015,000 jobs in the American economy. The states that contained 70 percent of the U.S . population lost jobs tha t year every time the military budget went up. Our current updating of this [sic] data indicates that with every increase of just $1 billion in the military budget, 9,000 jobs disappear in our own country . That is a net loss of jobs. It takes into consideration all of the jobs generated through military contracts and through military salaries . . . A few specific examples should suffice. If you spen d a billion dollars on retail trade, you generate 65,000 jobs. If you spend it on education, you generate 62,000 jobs; on hospitals, 48,000 jobs; on guided missiles and ordinance , 14,000 jobs (Anderson, 1983; p. 185). Now then, what happens to these peo ple? If the military sector, dollar-fordollar, emplo ys fewer people, and there is increasing investment in the military sector, the net result is staggering unemployment. This is hardly a reinforcing condition. With respect to developing countries, United Nations data show that the share of the economies of these countries diverted to military spending has doubled during the ten year period 1972-1981. UN scenarios show that systema tic arms reductions, when compared to a continuing arms race, would result in a greatly increased gross domestic product (GDP), higher employm ent, and a greater accumulation of capital stock. ( UNCT AD. Trade and Development Report; cited in World Marxist Review, 1984; p. 121). The continued diversion of national wealth into military purchasing all but guarantees the continuation of aversive conditions found in the developing countries: a high rate of infant mortality, illiteracy, inaccessible health care, and a host of other social problems . What does all of this suggest with respect to the behaviors of those persons opposing the arms race? First, with respect to short-term goals, our behaviors which reduce the probability of Congressional representatives authorizing and allocating tax dollars for nuclear weapons and other military hardware are a significant point of countercontrol. (I want to note in passing ' that the views of the majority of the population have had little ot no effect on the behavior of the President, as evidenced by polls showing majority support for, e. g., the nuclear freeze, delays in the deployment of missiles in Europe, reducing/freezing the military budget, the right of women to have choices over their own bodies, etc. Thus, I believe that writing or telephoning the President to be wasted behavior in terms of effecting the behavior of the President and/or his advisers. It is noneth eless important that such behavior occur, given the President 's penchant for proclaiming that he is merely carrying out the mandate of the voters, as expressed in the results of the last election, where approximately 70% of the electorate did not vote for him .) Congressional debate over the budget is in progress. Thus , letters to representatives urging at the minimum a freeze on military spending at the level of the last budget will have an effect. Additionally, writers should strongly urge sharp cuts in funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"). Second, as we know from applied behavioral analytic research, a lack of unity among those who implement behavioral procedures can substantially weaken their effects. Variables which divide people committed to a nuclear-free world will similarly weaken the effects of their behavior on otherwise agreed upon points of countercontrol. For example, an uncritical acceptance of statements related to the Soviet Union's "motives" and beha viors made by U.S. governmen t officials and echoed in the media can readily reduce the number of people acting to oppose funding for nuclear weapons. Such a division weakens countercontrol efforts, and makes nuclear weapons production more probable. It is not simply divisiveness that is at issue here , however. The spectre of the Russian bear hungrily devou ring free countries and enslaving the "minds" of heretofore free peoples is an image that once again fills editorial pages and the verbal behavior of print and electronic journalists. That is, the media reproduce the images and verbal statements of the federal government , and thus do not serve their function independent , of the government in these matters. Dorman (1983), for example, has examined in detail the news reporting found in both print and electronic journalism in relation to two Soviet lei!,ders (Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov), and the debate over the MX missile . Dorman concluded: Unfortunately, at least for those hoping for a vigorous and enlarged debate over U.S. defense policy and this country's relations with the Soviet L ______ __________________________ _ .. Unio n, the surve y turned up ample evidence that the mainstream media have not changed substantively in how they present the U.S.S.R. to the American people. Russian intentions and behavior continue to be painted in the darkest possible shades, journalistic themes persist in echoing those of official Washington, Americans' worst fears go unchallenged in the press, and labels continue to be substituted for analysis (p. 4). A more recen t example of such journalism can be found in a colum n by Tom Wicker (1985) in the New York Times. In that column, Mr. Wicker explained his decision not to participate in a conference funded in large part by the U.S . State Department. At the conference "speaker after speaker denounced the notion that there is no moral difference" between the United States and the Soviet Union. Echoing such sentiments, Wicker wrote "it seems to me a virtually indisputable proposition that the United States , with its free society, is not to be equated with the Soviet Union and its totalitarian system and dark history of purges and oppression." There is no discussion of the actual history and nature of Soviet society. Wicker merely repeats the assertions of the State Departmen t and a number of political figures, includ ing Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Secretary of Education William Bennett. The assumptions we hold, and the arguments we make, therefore, will most likely be the assumptions and arguments given to us by a government which has as its principal interest the expan sion of nuclear weaponry at the expense of world peace and the comfort of its own citizens. We would do well to examine the historical record of the Soviet Union with respect to weapons development, arms control proposa ls, and unilateral initiatives, as one means of maintaining unity in the face of such attemp ts to divide us (see, e. g., Guerre, 1984). Additionally, a fundamental question lurks behind the constant barrage of government assertions of the culpability of the Soviet Union for the renewed arms race . Quite simply, where would the United States government's push for such nuclear arms be without the