An Argument for a Phenomenological Pragmatic Conception of Truth

Correspondence theories of truth claim that truth involves a relationship between ideas in the mind and facts in the world, but because minds are viewed as being disconnected from the world, there is no way to determine whether beliefs are true or false under the correspondence view. For truth to be a meaningful concept, a theory about it must conceive of it in a way that is meaningful for humans. By looking at Heidegger’s ideas about phenomenology and humans as Dasein I argue for a framework that does not rest on a Cartesian subject/object dualism, and instead grounds concepts, like truth, in experience. I then turn to William James’ pragmatic theory of truth as “what works” and argue that it is applicable for Dasein and provides a meaningful conception of truth. In Experimental Phenomenology, Don Idhe makes the observation that pragmatism and phenomenology are both “philosophies of experience” (Idhe 115). Both reject Cartesianism and Platonic questions about existence (Idhe 117) and are instead concerned with human experience in the world. A difference that he observes between the two is that pragmatism is oriented towards action (Idhe 117), while phenomenology is concerned with description (Idhe 118). Rather than seeing this difference as grounds for separating phenomenology from pragmatism, Idhe suggests that a complementary “postphenomenology” is possible (Idhe 118). Following Idhe, I contend that while phenomenology provides a basis for philosophical inquiry, concepts which have a practical value, such as truth, are best understood with the application of a pragmatic lens. To make my contention I will look at truth in particular and argue that it is a concept that must be approached phenomenologically and should be conceived in pragmatic terms. To do this, I will first critique Bertrand Russell’s portrayal of the correspondence view of truth as resting on an untenable Cartesian dualism. Then I will look at Martin Res Cogitans (2014) 5 Novak | 137 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans Heidegger’s conception of the phenomenological method as providing grounds for human philosophical inquiry, and at his views on human understanding being an interpretation of our projects in the world. Following this, I will argue that the pragmatic notion of truth, as articulated by William James, provides a meaningful conception of truth for humans in the world. Similar to common sense notions is the correspondence theory of truth. In his defense of correspondence, Bertrand Russell lists three conditions that must be met by a theory of truth. First, he says that any theory must also account for what is meant by falsehood. If truth is to be a meaningful term, a theory about it needs to admit that not everything can be true. Whatever “truth” is, its opposite must be falsehood (Russell 277). Second, he says that “truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements” (Russell 278). He does this to differentiate truth from “fact”. Facts apply to extant material things, but truth applies to the mind. A fact just is. There can be no false facts, but the beliefs held by a mind can be either true or false. His third condition involves the relationship between the beliefs and facts. Facts are in the world and beliefs are about things in the world (Russell 278). The three conditions lead Russell to propose that “truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and fact” (Russell 278). A belief is true when the image or sense a mind has about a fact is the same as the fact in the world; when the two differ the belief is false. There is a problem here which Russell acknowledges. He says that “if truth consists in a correspondence of thought with something outside of thought, thought can never know when truth has been attained” (Russell 278). For Russell, this means that correspondence correctly explains what truth is, but it is ultimately not possible to test whether a belief is true or false. Russell’s account of truth as correspondence implies a Cartesian duality which makes truth an unusable concept. As evidenced by his distinction of material facts and mental beliefs, his theory rests on the assumption that there is an objective world external to the subjective mind. The mind might have a belief about the world that reflects how the world actually is, in which case the belief is true, but because the two are detached, the subjective mind can never be sure that the belief actually reflects the world, so it is not possible for the mind to ever know if its beliefs are true or false. As long as truth is conceived in such a way, the best that can be said about any proposition or belief is: “It might be true, and it might not, we don’t know.” “Truth” which is unusable is especially problematic given that truth is a word which has practical value, in that our lives are greatly affected by what we see as true or false. This is seen in all sorts of cases, from everyday activity to matters of national importance. If I believe it is true that a certain film is being shown at a local theater, then I may attempt to go see the film. Conversely, if policy makers believe that theories Res Cogitans (2014) 5 Novak | 138 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans about anthropogenic climate change are false, then they are unlikely to take any measures against climate change. A theory of truth can account for the practical importance given to the word when it is recognized that the Cartesian assumption is unnecessary and untenable. The subjective/objective dichotomy rests on the maxim that nothing can be known outside of consciousness. However, it goes on to posit the existence of a world which is inaccessible to consciousness. Given the first premise, the second is unjustifiable. It is still possible for the external world to exist, but since it is by definition unknowable, humans can make no justifiable statements about it. A claim about truth, or anything else for that matter, must be based on what can be experienced. Phenomenology begins with experience, and, by avoiding Cartesian dualism, it can be used to define truth in a meaningful and usable way. Heideggerian phenomenology looks at human experience of the world and sees the ways in which we can talk about the world as being based on those experiences. Heidegger rejects the notion that we can talk about something which exists, but which is detached from experience. Rather than viewing phenomenology as a school of thought, Heidegger first identifies phenomenology as a “methodological conception” (Heidegger 278). That is, phenomenology tells us how to approach a given question. To get at what it is to do phenomenology, Heidegger breaks the word down into its morphemes “phenomenon” and “logos” (Heidegger 279). Phenomenon is related to “light.” Things become revealed when they are lit, likewise, a phenomenon is “that which shows itself in itself, the manifest” (Heidegger 279). Phenomena are what reveal themselves to us or could reveal themselves to us. However, the first thing to consider is not what is being revealed, but how it is being revealed. After revealing itself in a certain way (how), an object is determined to resemble something (what) (Heidegger 279). However, what it is seen to resemble is not what it really is (we cannot say what it really is, only what it “seems” like). This second thing (the what or seeming like), Heidegger calls “semblance”, and he distinguishes it from phenomenon (Heidegger 280). For this reason, phenomenology leaves open the question of what something is and refers to how something is revealing (or can reveal) itself. Relating to the term “logos”, Heidegger translates it as “discourse” (Heidegger 282). Like light again, discourse “‘lets something be seen’” (Heidegger 282). Discourse is speaking (Hediegger 283) which brings to light more information, more concepts, and more ways of seeing things. When one speaks about something, there is the speaker, the act of speaking (the Greek term Heidegger uses is legein), and the thing spoken about (legomenon). The legomenon is the substrate of the discourse (i.e. the something which reveals itself before it is spoken about), and the speaker, the self, stands in relation to the legomenon. Thus, logos as discourse is conceived as a relationship. Res Cogitans (2014) 5 Novak | 139 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans Combining the phenomenon which reveals itself and the discourse about the phenomenon yields “phenomenology.” The purpose of phenomenology is “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (Heidegger 284). Thus, doing phenomenology means describing (i.e. bringing into consciousness through discourse) how things reveal themselves to us (i.e. how phenomena is encountered). Phenomenological method and Heideggerian terminology provide a new vocabulary and framework for approaching the topic of truth. Unlike in Russell, there is no object which stands in relation to the subject, but which is ultimately admitted to be unknowable and inaccessible to the subject. A relationship still exists, but it is between the speaker and the legomenon; and the legomenon is known and accessible to the speaker because it has revealed itself to the speaker. Insofar as speaking is phenomenological, it would presently seem that discourse about any topic, truth or otherwise, would have to be limited to descriptions about phenomena. However, Heidegger sees phenomenology as also being interpretive. In order to elucidate the interpretive aspect of phenomenology, I will discuss Heidegger’s conception of human Being-in-the-world. The move from description of phenomena to interpretation of phenomena by humans will provide the means and context for looking at James’ pragmatic theory of truth. Phenomenology has been defined as speaking about phenomena; but it has not yet been made clear how phenomena reveal themselves, or to whom they reveal themselves. It is humans in “the world” who are encountering phenomena and doing phenomenology. Heidegger uses the term “Dasein” to describe human existence, or “Being-in-theworld”. “The world” here refers to where Dasein lives (Heidegger 289). Living in the world means having “dealings in the world and with entities within-the-world” (Heidegger 291). Entities are the various naturally occurring, human made, and living “things” that we encounter (Heidegger 289). Things are not encountered from a disinterested theoretical standpoint. Living as having dealings means that things are always encountered with some purpose in mind, or some concern. Heidegger’s example is that a door handle is not just encountered as something simply there, but as a means for opening a door in order to, say, meet someone. His term for these things we encounter that concern us is “equipment” (Heidegger 292). Equipment reveals itself to us in a variety of ways. As equipment, it is “ready-to-hand”, which means that rather than being thought about and understood theoretically, it is just used. Heidegger’s example is that a hammer only shows itself as a hammer when it is used for hammering. When equipment is being used properly it “withdraws” from our concern (Heidegger 293). For example, a hammer that is hammering is being used to drive a nail, which could be one step in building a house. In that case the concern is with creating living space, and not with the hammer. All projects are like the example Res Cogitans (2014) 5 Novak | 14