Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games ? The
نویسنده
چکیده
AI lab, Computer Science Department, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium MLG, Département d’Informatique, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Boulevard du Triomphe CP212, 1050 Brussels, Belgium School of Computing, Teesside University, Borough Road, Middlesbrough TS1 3BA, UK Centro de Inteligência Artificial (CENTRIA), Departamento de Informática, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2829-516 Caparica, Portugal
منابع مشابه
Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?
When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of public goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one ca...
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Public goods games have become the mathematical metaphor for game theoretical investigations of cooperative behavior in groups of interacting individuals. Cooperation is a conundrum because cooperators make a sacrifice to benefit others at some cost to themselves. Exploiters or defectors reap the benefits and forgo costs. Despite the fact that groups of cooperators outperform groups of defector...
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