Followers’ Strategy in Stackelberg Equilibrium Problems on Curved Strategy Sets
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium points on strategy sets which are geodesic convex in certain Riemannian manifolds by using metric projection arguments. The present results extend those obtained in Nagy [J. Global Optimization (2013)] in the Euclidean context.
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