Friendly Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games with Complete Information
نویسنده
چکیده
In this note we prove an existence theorem regarding friendly equilibrium points in extensive games with complete information. The friendly equilibrium points is a refinement of equilibrium points. *) Director del Instituto de Matemática Aplicada. Universidad Nacional de San Luis, CONICET, Ejército de los Andes 950. C.P. 5700 San Luis. Argentina **) This paper has been partially supported by a grant from the CONICET.
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