Truth , Disquotation , and Expression On McGinn ’ s Theory of Truth

In Logical Properties, Colin McGinn offers a new theory of truth, which he describes as “thick disquotationalism.” In keeping with wider theme of the book, truth emerges as conceptually primitive. Echoing Moore, it is simple and unanalyzable. Though truth cannot be analyzed, in the sense of giving a conceptual decomposition, McGinn argues that truth can be defined. A non-circular statement of its application conditions can be given. This makes truth a singularly remarkable property. Indeed, by McGinn’s lights, it is the only property which enjoys being both unanalyzable and definable.1 McGinn argues that truth has a core feature which gives it this remarkable nature: the disquotation feature. This is the feature which allows us to step from It is true that φ to φ . Truth is defined as the unique property for which this holds as an entailment. In McGinn’s words, “truth is the (unique) property of a proposition from which one can deduce the fact stated by the proposition” (p. 97). Focusing on this sort of connection is also the hallmark of deflationist theories of truth. Strong forms of deflationism argue that truth is not a property at all, or not a ‘substantial’ property. McGinn argues that the central role of the disquotation feature does not imply any such deflationism. Truth is, according to McGinn a fully robust property, though one whose “essence” is disquotation (p. 87). (McGinn’s disquotationalism is thus “thick,” as opposed to deflationists who’s disquotationalism is “thin.”) There is much in McGinn’s basic outlook with which I am sympathetic. I agree with him that ∗Thanks to Brad Armour-Garb, J. C. Beall, and Carol Voeller for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 1I shall not have space for a proper investigation of the idea of an unanalyzable but definable property. For an interesting discussion of Moore’s version of the view that truth is simple and unanalyzable, see Cartwright (1987).