Intuition in the Cognitive Science

نویسنده

  • STEVEN HORST
چکیده

This article examines the notions of “intuitive” and “counterintuitive” beliefs and concepts in cognitive science of religion. “Intuitive” states are contrasted with those that are products of explicit, conscious reasoning. In many cases the intuitions are grounded in the implicit rules of mental models, frames, or schemas. I argue that the pathway from intuitive to high theological concepts and beliefs may be distinct from that from intuitions to “folk religion,” and discuss how Christian theology might best interpret the results of studies in cognitive psychology of religion. In Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR), religious concepts and beliefs have been characterized as “intuitive” or “counterintuitive” by psychologists (Barrett 2004; Bloom 2004; Kelemen 2004) and anthropologists (Boyer 2001); and others (Pyysiäinen 2004, following Sperber 1997) have made use of a notion of “intuitive” representations in their accounts of religious cognition. The word ‘intuition’ and its variants are, of course, used in several different ways in ordinary language, and have also been used in multiple technical ways in philosophy, psychology, and other academic disciplines. I shall first examine recent uses of these terms in CSR, clarifying them in relation to existing usages in philosophy and psychology which contrast “intuitive” states and processes with those that are products of conscious, explicit reasoning. I shall then outline an account of how intuitions are produced in the mind via the rules of what have variously been called mental models, schemas, or frames. In Section 3, I shall examine a few possible implications of this model-based account of intuition for CSR—particularly, the possibility that a study of the cognitive processes that produce “high theological” or “theologically correct” religious views might (somewhat surprisingly) be undertaken separately “Notions of Intuition in the Cognitive Science of Religion” by Steven Horst, The Monist, vol. 96, no. 2, pp. 377–398. Copyright © 2013, THE MONIST, Peru, Illinois 61354.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

ترجمه چکیده ها

contents Internalistic and externalistic justification on Swinburn’s epistemology/ Faezeh Golshani-Monfared/ Qasem Poorhasan Conceptualization of Doubt in the Qur’an; Cognitive field and lexical profiling/ Mohammad Rokkaei Explanation of consciousness in view of Russellian monism and evaluating its effectiveness in response to the pr...

متن کامل

The Brain's "New" Science: Psychology, Neurophysiology, and Constraint*

There is a strong philosophical intuition that direct study of the brain can and will constrain the development of psychological theory. When this intuition is tested against case studies from the psychology of perception and memory, it turns out that psychology has led the way toward knowledge of neurophysiology. An abstract argument is developed to show that psychology can and must lead the w...

متن کامل

Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise

Experimental philosophers have empirically challenged the connection between intuition and philosophical expertise. This paper reviews these challenges alongside other research findings in cognitive science on expert performance and argues for three claims. First, evidence taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by the wellresearched failures and limitations of genuine ...

متن کامل

ELT educational context, teacher intuition and learner hidden agenda (a study of conflicting maxims)

This study, first, attempted to explore the conflict or tension between EFL teacher intuition or concepts and the conception with a composite view assembled from learner's accounts of the distinctive features of Communicative Language Teaching (CLT), and second to investigate the latter's "hidden agenda" (Nunan, 1998) of what ELT should be. On the other hand, role of educational context as an i...

متن کامل

Herbert Simon. Artificial intelligence as a framework for understanding intuition

Herbert Simon made overlapping substantive contributions to the fields of economics, psychology, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, decision theory, and organization theory. Simon s work was motivated by the belief that neither the human mind, human thinking and decision making, nor human creativity need be mysterious. It was after he helped create ‘‘thinking’’ machines that Simon came...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2014