Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation
نویسندگان
چکیده
A prior signalling stage is added to the prisoner’s dilemma and the overall population involved is divided into a number of subpopulations. Evolution involves both local and global imitation—so that the process is formally one of “group selection.” A subpopulation that is not signalling and defecting against one and all can be invaded by two “secret handshake” mutants. A subpopulation that is composed entirely of the secret handshake strategy can be invaded by a single “sucker punch” mutant. Nevertheless, if there are at least three subpopulations, the population cooperates always, in the limit as the mutation rate tends to zero.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- IGTR
دوره 5 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003