Keynote speakers : Judith Jarvis Thomson ( MIT ) “ More on the Metaphysics of Harm ”

It has been claimed that psychologist Joshua Greene's recent neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about trolley-like cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about such cases. I disagree. As I see it, attempts to extract normative conclusions from Greene's research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, in which case the arguments rely on a blatantly fallacious inference, or they appeal to the (alleged) moral irrelevance of the factors to which deontological intuitions respond, in which case the neuroscientific results end up playing no role in the overall argument. • Comments: Dan Demetriou (Minnesota-Morris) • Session 17, Room 3 2. David Rhys Birks (Manchester): “Well-being, Schizophrenia, and Experience Machines” Abstract: In this paper I argue that we should broaden the category of individuals with schizophrenia who are eligible for involuntary treatment. I do this by constructing a thought experiment concerning a person who slips on a banana peel and falls into a malfunctioning version of Nozick’s experience machine. I propose that the reasons why we should remove the person from the machine are the same reasons why we should administer involuntary treatment to individuals with schizophrenia. I conclude by rebutting an objection to the analogy, namely that there is a morally relevant difference between the internal schizophrenia and external experience machine. In this paper I argue that we should broaden the category of individuals with schizophrenia who are eligible for involuntary treatment. I do this by constructing a thought experiment concerning a person who slips on a banana peel and falls into a malfunctioning version of Nozick’s experience machine. I propose that the reasons why we should remove the person from the machine are the same reasons why we should administer involuntary treatment to individuals with schizophrenia. I conclude by rebutting an objection to the analogy, namely that there is a morally relevant difference between the internal schizophrenia and external experience machine. • Comments: Anna-Karin Andersson (Stockholm) • Session 5, Room 1 RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 2 | P a g e 3. Ben Bradley (Syracuse): “Analyzing Harm” Abstract: Harm is widely thought to be a crucial concept in ethics. But philosophers rarely attempt to say what it is. Its nature is elusive. According to the comparative account of harm, an event is harmful iff it makes someone worse off than she would otherwise have been. There are two kinds of objections. The first is that it leaves out some harms, e.g. in cases of overdetermination or non-identity. The second is that it wrongly counts failures to benefit as harms. I defend the comparative account against these objections and raise problems for non-comparative and nonconsequentialist accounts of harm. Non-comparative views fail to account for harms of prevention, e.g. death, while non-consequentialist views fail to account for harms caused by non-agents. Harm is widely thought to be a crucial concept in ethics. But philosophers rarely attempt to say what it is. Its nature is elusive. According to the comparative account of harm, an event is harmful iff it makes someone worse off than she would otherwise have been. There are two kinds of objections. The first is that it leaves out some harms, e.g. in cases of overdetermination or non-identity. The second is that it wrongly counts failures to benefit as harms. I defend the comparative account against these objections and raise problems for non-comparative and nonconsequentialist accounts of harm. Non-comparative views fail to account for harms of prevention, e.g. death, while non-consequentialist views fail to account for harms caused by non-agents. • Comments: Justin Klockseim (Alabama-Tuscaloosa) • Session 17, Room 2 4. Helena de Bres (Wellesley): “The Many, Not the Few: Pluralism about Global Distributive Justice” Abstract: Several theorists have recently advocated a move towards a more “pluralistic” approach to global distributive justice. What exactly would this move involve, and is it a good idea? This paper attempts to make some headway on these questions. I begin by distinguishing several candidate forms of pluralism in the domain of distributive justice. I next show how each of these is well supported, although for different reasons, within three widely endorsed approaches to distributive justice in general. I then vindicate the claim that current philosophical writing on global distributive justice in particular, by proponents of these three approaches among others, is at most weakly pluralistic in nature. I argue that this anti-pluralistic strain is both surprising in light of the theoretical consensus highlighted earlier, and counter-intuitive on its own terms. I finish by offering a set of debunking explanations for the force that anti-pluralism about global distributive justice exerts upon us, despite its apparently weak rationale. Several theorists have recently advocated a move towards a more “pluralistic” approach to global distributive justice. What exactly would this move involve, and is it a good idea? This paper attempts to make some headway on these questions. I begin by distinguishing several candidate forms of pluralism in the domain of distributive justice. I next show how each of these is well supported, although for different reasons, within three widely endorsed approaches to distributive justice in general. I then vindicate the claim that current philosophical writing on global distributive justice in particular, by proponents of these three approaches among others, is at most weakly pluralistic in nature. I argue that this anti-pluralistic strain is both surprising in light of the theoretical consensus highlighted earlier, and counter-intuitive on its own terms. I finish by offering a set of debunking explanations for the force that anti-pluralism about global distributive justice exerts upon us, despite its apparently weak rationale. • Comments: Adam Hosein (CU-Boulder) • Session 15, Room 1 5. John Brunero (Missouri-Saint Louis): “Rational Intentions: A Unified Account” Abstract: Sometimes when philosophers discuss the rationality of intentions they do so in terms of beliefs whose truth would provide reasons. On this approach, your intention to jump into the canal is rational in light of your belief that the hotel is on fire because were your belief true, you would have sufficient reason to jump into the canal. Other times, when philosophers discuss the rationality of intentions, they formulate requirements of rationality, like intention consistency and means-ends coherence. How are these two ways of approaching the rationality of intentions related? In this paper, I present a Unified Account which aims to understand the second way in terms of the first. I set out the Account, and then provide some preliminary defense of the controversial claims to which the Account is committed, including a response to an objection, due to Kieran Setiya, having to do with intentions that cannot be modified. Sometimes when philosophers discuss the rationality of intentions they do so in terms of beliefs whose truth would provide reasons. On this approach, your intention to jump into the canal is rational in light of your belief that the hotel is on fire because were your belief true, you would have sufficient reason to jump into the canal. Other times, when philosophers discuss the rationality of intentions, they formulate requirements of rationality, like intention consistency and means-ends coherence. How are these two ways of approaching the rationality of intentions related? In this paper, I present a Unified Account which aims to understand the second way in terms of the first. I set out the Account, and then provide some preliminary defense of the controversial claims to which the Account is committed, including a response to an objection, due to Kieran Setiya, having to do with intentions that cannot be modified. • Comments: Doil Kim (Toronto) • Session 3, Room 4 RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 3 | P a g e 6. Alan Carter (Glasgow): “A Solution to the Purported Non-Transitivity of Normative Evaluation” Abstract: Derek Parfit presents his Mere Addition Paradox in order to demonstrate that it is extremely difficult to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. And in order to avoid it, Parfit has embraced perfectionism. However, Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin, taking their lead from Parfit, have concluded, instead, that the Repugnant Conclusion can be avoided by denying the axiom of transitivity with respect to the all-things-considered-better-than relation. But this seems to present a major challenge to how we evaluate normatively. In this article I show how the Repugnant Conclusion can be avoided without subscribing to perfectionism, while nevertheless retaining the axiom of transitivity. Derek Parfit presents his Mere Addition Paradox in order to demonstrate that it is extremely difficult to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. And in order to avoid it, Parfit has embraced perfectionism. However, Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin, taking their lead from Parfit, have concluded, instead, that the Repugnant Conclusion can be avoided by denying the axiom of transitivity with respect to the all-things-considered-better-than relation. But this seems to present a major challenge to how we evaluate normatively. In this article I show how the Repugnant Conclusion can be avoided without subscribing to perfectionism, while nevertheless retaining the axiom of transitivity. • Comments: Roksana Alavi (S Texas College) • Session 5, Room 2 7. Michael Cholbi (CSPU-Pomona): “Kant and Moral Dilemmas” Abstract: Every philosopher grants there are apparent moral dilemmas — but are there genuine dilemmas, situations in which, no matter what an agent does, she acts wrongly? In debates about the existence of genuine dilemmas, Kant is typically identified as a clear and uncompromising denier of such dilemmas. Here I argue that Kant’s view on moral dilemmas is instead a more subtle, methodological view according to which the denial of moral dilemmas is a regulative ideal for moral deliberation. Furthermore, this view helps to explain what is correct about two otherwise unsound arguments concerning moral dilemmas, one argument for their existence (Bernard Williams’ ‘moral residue’ argument) and a second argument against their existence (the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ argument). Every philosopher grants there are apparent moral dilemmas — but are there genuine dilemmas, situations in which, no matter what an agent does, she acts wrongly? In debates about the existence of genuine dilemmas, Kant is typically identified as a clear and uncompromising denier of such dilemmas. Here I argue that Kant’s view on moral dilemmas is instead a more subtle, methodological view according to which the denial of moral dilemmas is a regulative ideal for moral deliberation. Furthermore, this view helps to explain what is correct about two otherwise unsound arguments concerning moral dilemmas, one argument for their existence (Bernard Williams’ ‘moral residue’ argument) and a second argument against their existence (the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ argument). • Comments: Bob Hanna (CU-Boulder) • Session 14, Room 2 8. Thomas Christiano (Arizona): “Is there a Human Right to Democracy?” Abstract: I argue that there may be good grounds for thinking that there is a human right to democracy that is correlated with a positive duty on the part of all human beings to help create, maintain and support democratic institutions in all political societies. Answering this question as I approach the question, depends on a mix of philosophical theory and empirical evidence. First I will say a few things about the kind of human right I will be talking about, since I think there may be a number of different kinds of human rights. Then I will give two arguments for the idea that there is a human right to democracy: the dependence argument and the democratic argument. Along the way I will be exploring the relation between this assertion of a human right to democracy and the idea of collective self-determination. I will close by responding to the self-determination objection to the idea that there is a human right to democracy. I argue that there may be good grounds for thinking that there is a human right to democracy that is correlated with a positive duty on the part of all human beings to help create, maintain and support democratic institutions in all political societies. Answering this question as I approach the question, depends on a mix of philosophical theory and empirical evidence. First I will say a few things about the kind of human right I will be talking about, since I think there may be a number of different kinds of human rights. Then I will give two arguments for the idea that there is a human right to democracy: the dependence argument and the democratic argument. Along the way I will be exploring the relation between this assertion of a human right to democracy and the idea of collective self-determination. I will close by responding to the self-determination objection to the idea that there is a human right to democracy. • Comments: Louis-Philippe Hodgson (York/UCLA-Law) • Session 14, Room 1 9. Randolph Clarke (Florida State): “Because She Wanted To” Abstract: Often we explain someone’s action by citing a desire the agent had, e.g., “Laura raised her arm at that moment because she wanted to enter a bid on the painting that had just been presented for auction.” For such an explanation to be Often we explain someone’s action by citing a desire the agent had, e.g., “Laura raised her arm at that moment because she wanted to enter a bid on the painting that had just been presented for auction.” For such an explanation to be RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 4 | P a g e true, must the desire in question have caused the agent’s action? Carl Ginet says no. He has advanced and defended a view on which an action correctly so explained need not be caused by anything at all. Here it is argued that Ginet has failed to come to grips with problems faced by his view of action explanation. • Comments: Meghan Griffith (Davidson) • Session 5, Room 4 10. Daniel Cohen (U Miami): “Love, Friendship, and Well-Being: A Reply to the "Moral Schizophrenia" Argument against Modern Ethical Theories” Abstract: Michael Stocker famously argued that someone who accepts the justifications of a modern ethical theory can’t attain certain goods, such as love and friendship, without suffering a split between motive and reason. Does this mean that we have reason to reject modern ethical theories? In reply I argue that the goods Stocker’s argument appeals to—friendship, love, community, personal relationships—may themselves turn out to involve splits between reason and motive that actually enhance the ways these goods can contribute positively to our lives. Thus as friends, lovers, and so on, we may actually have reason to accept, rather than reject, one of these theories. My reply assumes that undergoing a split between reason and motive won’t fragment the point of view from which we must judge what benefits and harms us. I defend my reply against a class of desire-based views of well-being on which this assumption wouldn’t hold. Michael Stocker famously argued that someone who accepts the justifications of a modern ethical theory can’t attain certain goods, such as love and friendship, without suffering a split between motive and reason. Does this mean that we have reason to reject modern ethical theories? In reply I argue that the goods Stocker’s argument appeals to—friendship, love, community, personal relationships—may themselves turn out to involve splits between reason and motive that actually enhance the ways these goods can contribute positively to our lives. Thus as friends, lovers, and so on, we may actually have reason to accept, rather than reject, one of these theories. My reply assumes that undergoing a split between reason and motive won’t fragment the point of view from which we must judge what benefits and harms us. I defend my reply against a class of desire-based views of well-being on which this assumption wouldn’t hold. • Comments: Jennifer Baker (College of Charleston) • Session 15, Room 4 11. Christian Coons (Bowling Green): “How to Prove that Some Acts are Right or Wrong (Without Using Substantive Moral Assumptions)” Abstract: I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: Φing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain why the following conditional-type is true: If φing would be morally required, if anything is, then φing is actually morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive moral claim; I use only plausible claims that most moral skeptics and error theorists can and do accept. The final section diagnoses why my arguments work. Here, I offer an explanation for the supervenience of the moral on the nonmoral that may help those worried that the strategy is a sophisticated trick. I conclude by considering two objections. In replying to these objections, I explain why the strategy may allow us to demonstrate more than “obvious” moral truths, and why it may also address a stronger version of error theory, according to which, moral truths are not possible. I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: Φing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain why the following conditional-type is true: If φing would be morally required, if anything is, then φing is actually morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive moral claim; I use only plausible claims that most moral skeptics and error theorists can and do accept. The final section diagnoses why my arguments work. Here, I offer an explanation for the supervenience of the moral on the nonmoral that may help those worried that the strategy is a sophisticated trick. I conclude by considering two objections. In replying to these objections, I explain why the strategy may allow us to demonstrate more than “obvious” moral truths, and why it may also address a stronger version of error theory, according to which, moral truths are not possible. • Comments: David Boonin (CU-Boulder) • Session 12, Room 2 12. Eva Dadlez (Central Oklahoma) and William L. Andrews (Central Oklahoma): “Spinning the Harm Principle” Abstract: The contention that abortion harms women constitutes a new strategy employed by the pro-life movement to supplement arguments about fetal rights. The contention that abortion harms women constitutes a new strategy employed by the pro-life movement to supplement arguments about fetal rights. RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 5 | P a g e David C. Reardon is a prominent promoter of this strategy. Post-abortion syndrome purports to establish that abortion psychologically harms women and, indeed, can harm persons associated with women who have abortions. Thus, harms that abortion is alleged to produce are multiplied. Claims of repression are employed to complicate efforts to disprove the existence of psychological harm and causal antecedents of trauma are only selectively investigated. We argue that there is no such thing as post-abortion syndrome and that the psychological harms Reardon and others claim abortion inflicts on women can usually be ascribed to different causes. We question the evidence accumulated by Reardon and his analysis of data accumulated by others. Most importantly, we question whether the conclusions Reardon has drawn follow from the evidence he cites. • Comments: Judith Kissell (Creighton) • Session 1, Room 1 13. Dale Dorsey (Kansas): “What is Instrumental Value?” Abstract: Call the form of value that supervenes--at least in part--on the extrinsic properties of an object "extrinsic value". Call the form of value that supervenes wholly on the intrinsic properties of an object "intrinsic value". That instrumental value is a form of extrinsic value is generally accepted. In this paper, I argue that this claim is false. Through the use of three examples, I argue that whether an object or state is instrumentally valuable depends on the possession a certain dispositional property, viz., the disposition to causally contribute to the production of finally valuable states. If so, most forms of instrumental value will be forms of intrinsic value: dispositional properties are (generally) shared among intrinsic duplicates. It follows that the so-called "Moorean" account of final value (viz., that final value and intrinsic value are identical concepts) is false: the Moorean cannot adequately distinguish between final value and instrumental value. Call the form of value that supervenes--at least in part--on the extrinsic properties of an object "extrinsic value". Call the form of value that supervenes wholly on the intrinsic properties of an object "intrinsic value". That instrumental value is a form of extrinsic value is generally accepted. In this paper, I argue that this claim is false. Through the use of three examples, I argue that whether an object or state is instrumentally valuable depends on the possession a certain dispositional property, viz., the disposition to causally contribute to the production of finally valuable states. If so, most forms of instrumental value will be forms of intrinsic value: dispositional properties are (generally) shared among intrinsic duplicates. It follows that the so-called "Moorean" account of final value (viz., that final value and intrinsic value are identical concepts) is false: the Moorean cannot adequately distinguish between final value and instrumental value. • Comments: Graham Oddie (CU-Boulder) • Session 16, Room 3 14. Mathieu Doucet (Queen’s University): “What’s Wrong with Hypocrisy?” Abstract: Hypocrisy is among the most common vices, and it is among the most widely condemned. But this is puzzling: hypocrisy seems to involve the pretence of virtue, motivated by a desire to appear virtuous rather than to actually be virtuous. But surely trying to appear virtuous is not the worst thing someone can do. So why are we so hard on hypocrites? Most philosophical accounts of hypocrisy argue that it involves a form of deception, and that this explains why it is wrong. In this paper, I offer a different account: on my view, hypocrites care too much about their image for having certain values, and this excessive concern for their image leads them, in many different ways, to fail to honour the values that they claim to have. This account forces us to reconsider the moral status of hypocrisy: perhaps it is not as vicious as we make it out to be. Hypocrisy is among the most common vices, and it is among the most widely condemned. But this is puzzling: hypocrisy seems to involve the pretence of virtue, motivated by a desire to appear virtuous rather than to actually be virtuous. But surely trying to appear virtuous is not the worst thing someone can do. So why are we so hard on hypocrites? Most philosophical accounts of hypocrisy argue that it involves a form of deception, and that this explains why it is wrong. In this paper, I offer a different account: on my view, hypocrites care too much about their image for having certain values, and this excessive concern for their image leads them, in many different ways, to fail to honour the values that they claim to have. This account forces us to reconsider the moral status of hypocrisy: perhaps it is not as vicious as we make it out to be. • Comments: Jonathan Peterson (Toronto) • Session 7, Room 4 15. Mylan Engel Jr. (Northern Illinois): “Ethics without a Net: How to do Practical Ethics without a Moral Theory” Abstract: Elsewhere, I have argued that your own beliefs commit you to the immorality of eating meat. I’ve also used your beliefs as premises to argue that we Elsewhere, I have argued that your own beliefs commit you to the immorality of eating meat. I’ve also used your beliefs as premises to argue that we RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 6 | P a g e have positive duties to assist the poor and to argue that biomedical animal experimentation is wrong. The present paper examines whether this consistencybased approach of grounding particular moral judgments on beliefs a person already holds, with no appeal to moral theory, is a legitimate way of doing practical ethics. I argue (i) that grounding particular moral judgments on a person’s core moral convictions and other core nonmoral beliefs is a legitimate way to justify moral judgments, (ii) that these moral judgments possess as much epistemic justification and have as much claim to objectivity as moral judgments grounded on particular ethical theories, and (iii) that this internalistic coherentist method of grounding moral judgments is more likely to result in behavioral guidance than traditional theory-based approaches to practical ethics. By way of illustration, I begin by briefly recapitulating my consistency-based argument for ethical vegetarianism. I then defend the internalistic coherentist approach implicit in the argument against a number of potentially fatal metatheoretical attacks. • Comments: Uri Leibowitz (CU-Boulder) • Session 2, Room 1 16. Ryan Fanselow (Maryland): “Dogmatism and Reflective Equilibrium” • Comments: John Maier (ANU) • Session 2, Room 4 17. Michael Ferry (Spring Hill College): “Does Morality Demand our Very Best? On Moral Prescriptions and the Line of Duty” Abstract: It is widely accepted that morality does not demand that we do our very best, but our most significant moral traditions do not easily accommodate this intuition. I will argue that the underlying problem is not specific to any particular tradition. Rather, it will be difficult for any moral theory to account for binary moral concepts like permissible/impermissible while also accounting for scalar moral concepts like better/worse. If only the best is considered permissible, morality will seem either unreasonably demanding or implausibly minimal. But if we draw a line of duty below the optimal, then we must explain how the act that is worse is nonetheless permissible. Some have tried to explain this by appealing to non-moral considerations, and others have appealed to agent-relative moral considerations. I argue that no such approach will work. We should instead exploit the distinction between reasons for performing an act and reasons for holding someone accountable for an act’s performance. This approach will also help to clear up a confusion regarding the notion of a moral demand. It is widely accepted that morality does not demand that we do our very best, but our most significant moral traditions do not easily accommodate this intuition. I will argue that the underlying problem is not specific to any particular tradition. Rather, it will be difficult for any moral theory to account for binary moral concepts like permissible/impermissible while also accounting for scalar moral concepts like better/worse. If only the best is considered permissible, morality will seem either unreasonably demanding or implausibly minimal. But if we draw a line of duty below the optimal, then we must explain how the act that is worse is nonetheless permissible. Some have tried to explain this by appealing to non-moral considerations, and others have appealed to agent-relative moral considerations. I argue that no such approach will work. We should instead exploit the distinction between reasons for performing an act and reasons for holding someone accountable for an act’s performance. This approach will also help to clear up a confusion regarding the notion of a moral demand. • Comments: Zac Cogley (UCLA) • Session 2, Room 2 18. Steve Finlay (U of Southern California): “Metaethical Contextualism Defended” Abstract: According to metaethical contextualism, by uttering the same ‘ought’ sentences different speakers can express different propositions, because ‘ought’ is semantically incomplete and has one or more open argument-places that can be filled in different ways. There are reasons to think that ‘ought’ claims are relativized both to (i) bodies of information, and (ii) standards (or ends). Contextualism about information-relativity and contextualism about standard-relativity both face parallel objections stemming from their treatment of our practices of disagreeing across contexts. I argue first that contextualists can and should respond to Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane’s attack on contextualism about information-relativity by adopting According to metaethical contextualism, by uttering the same ‘ought’ sentences different speakers can express different propositions, because ‘ought’ is semantically incomplete and has one or more open argument-places that can be filled in different ways. There are reasons to think that ‘ought’ claims are relativized both to (i) bodies of information, and (ii) standards (or ends). Contextualism about information-relativity and contextualism about standard-relativity both face parallel objections stemming from their treatment of our practices of disagreeing across contexts. I argue first that contextualists can and should respond to Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane’s attack on contextualism about information-relativity by adopting RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 7 | P a g e a certain pragmatic strategy. Then I show that structurally the same strategy is open to the contextualist as a response to Brian Weatherson’s attack on contextualism about standard-relativity. (This paper is drawn from a longer paper coauthored by Gunnar Björnsson). • Comments: Brian Weatherson (Rutgers) • Session 15, Room 3 19. Richard Galvin (Texas Christian) and John Harris (Texas Christian): “Pass the Cocoamone, Please": Causal Impotence, Opportunistic Vegetarianism and ActUtilitarianism” • Comments: Alastair Norcross (CU-Boulder) • Session 6, Room 1 20. Jon Garthoff (Northwestern): “Meriting Concern and Meriting Respect” Abstract: We need a criterion for when the fact that states of affairs can be good or bad for an individual entails that we have reason to promote that individual’s wellbeing. We need, in other words, a criterion of moral standing; and in this essay I argue that sentience is the relevant criterion. In the first half of the essay I defend this hypothesis against what I take to be its chief rival: being alive. In the second half of the essay I explore a few implications of the claim that sentience is the criterion of moral standing, and I explain why this hypothesis is consistent with the claim that persons are of a higher moral status than sentient animals. We need a criterion for when the fact that states of affairs can be good or bad for an individual entails that we have reason to promote that individual’s wellbeing. We need, in other words, a criterion of moral standing; and in this essay I argue that sentience is the relevant criterion. In the first half of the essay I defend this hypothesis against what I take to be its chief rival: being alive. In the second half of the essay I explore a few implications of the claim that sentience is the criterion of moral standing, and I explain why this hypothesis is consistent with the claim that persons are of a higher moral status than sentient animals. • Comments: Benjamin Hale (CU-Boulder) • Session 7, Room 1 21. Jyl Gentzler (Amherst College): “On the Track of the Good Life: An Objectivist, Reductionist Account of What We Ought to Do” Abstract: Though it’s now considered impolite and disrespectful to question other people’s priorities, most of us still indulge the thought that some people are just messed-up. No matter what they might think, they ought to pursue different final ends. Despite the difficulties involved in vindicating such judgments, I believe that they are perfectly reasonable. In particular, it seems to me that judgments of the form “S ought to q” are true just in case they follow through sound practical reasoning from correct deliberative final ends that are assigned the correct weight. Our firm intuitions about the sorts of deliberative final ends that count as correct for human beings, and so, which considerations count as genuine reasons for humans to act, pick out those ends that, if normal humans were to give weight to them in the normal way in normal circumstances in practical deliberation, they would be led to decisions about what they ought to do that more or less reliably contribute to their biological ends by helping them to flourish or live good lives as humans. Individuals can have correct ends, yet give them the wrong weight in their deliberation. Holding the weight of a particular end fixed from one deliberative occasion to another, the more correct the weighting of a particular end, the more reliable the results. Though it’s now considered impolite and disrespectful to question other people’s priorities, most of us still indulge the thought that some people are just messed-up. No matter what they might think, they ought to pursue different final ends. Despite the difficulties involved in vindicating such judgments, I believe that they are perfectly reasonable. In particular, it seems to me that judgments of the form “S ought to q” are true just in case they follow through sound practical reasoning from correct deliberative final ends that are assigned the correct weight. Our firm intuitions about the sorts of deliberative final ends that count as correct for human beings, and so, which considerations count as genuine reasons for humans to act, pick out those ends that, if normal humans were to give weight to them in the normal way in normal circumstances in practical deliberation, they would be led to decisions about what they ought to do that more or less reliably contribute to their biological ends by helping them to flourish or live good lives as humans. Individuals can have correct ends, yet give them the wrong weight in their deliberation. Holding the weight of a particular end fixed from one deliberative occasion to another, the more correct the weighting of a particular end, the more reliable the results. • Comments: Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College) • Session 1, Room 2 RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 8 | P a g e 22. Margaret Gilbert (UC-Irvine): “Giving Claim Rights Their Due” Abstract: Rights are so often appealed to in contemporary moral, political, and legal discourse that it is of great importance to clarify our ideas about them. Claims were regarded by the legal theorist Wesley Hohfeld as rights “in the strictest sense”. Yet after much discussion rights theorists disagree as to when exactly one has a claim or (in more common parlance) claim-right. Opting for an approach to claim-rights different from the most standard one in aim and method, I articulate an account of them that accords with important points made by H. L. A. Hart, and Joel Feinberg. This account raises a question, to which I offer an answer. As I explain, this answer respects a point on which all rights theorists agree: the rights of the parties to everyday agreements and promises are paradigmatic claim-rights. It also implies that a standard distinction between legal and moral rights is not exhaustive, and suggests a bold conjecture that is briefly discussed with reference to the work of Judith Thomson. Rights are so often appealed to in contemporary moral, political, and legal discourse that it is of great importance to clarify our ideas about them. Claims were regarded by the legal theorist Wesley Hohfeld as rights “in the strictest sense”. Yet after much discussion rights theorists disagree as to when exactly one has a claim or (in more common parlance) claim-right. Opting for an approach to claim-rights different from the most standard one in aim and method, I articulate an account of them that accords with important points made by H. L. A. Hart, and Joel Feinberg. This account raises a question, to which I offer an answer. As I explain, this answer respects a point on which all rights theorists agree: the rights of the parties to everyday agreements and promises are paradigmatic claim-rights. It also implies that a standard distinction between legal and moral rights is not exhaustive, and suggests a bold conjecture that is briefly discussed with reference to the work of Judith Thomson. • Comments: Gopal Sreenivasan (Duke) • Session 3, Room 1 23. Elizabeth Harman (Princeton): “'I'll Be Glad I Did It' Reasoning and the Significance of Future Desires” • Comments: Chris Heathwood (CU-Boulder) • Session 11, Room 3 24. Elisa Hurley (Western Ontario) and Coleen Macnamara (UC-Riverside): “Toward a Theory of Reactive Attitudes” • Comments: Neal Tognazzini (UC-Riverside) • Session 16, Room 4 25. Stan Husi (Rice): “Promising—A Practice and Nothing More?” Abstract: What is the normative status of promissory standards? I promise I’ll pick you up and suddenly I’m subjected to standards telling me what to do next. Now my staying at home and watching TV counts as a normative failure. Transforming practical episodes from normatively innocent into normatively guilty is no minor feat promissory standards pull off. Yet wherein rests their authority? The position I defend – the exhaustive practice position or EPP for short – claims that the authority of those standards entirely rests in promissory practices; no justification flows to promissory norms from any practice-independent order. What would that mean for our promissory commitments? Some have worried that if true EPP would undermine our promissory commitments; rendering them unsustainable without the assurance that promissory standards are sanctioned by some practice-external authority. My paper seeks to dislodge this concern, arguing that EPP offers a selfaffirmative rather than self-defeating interpretation of promissory practices. What is the normative status of promissory standards? I promise I’ll pick you up and suddenly I’m subjected to standards telling me what to do next. Now my staying at home and watching TV counts as a normative failure. Transforming practical episodes from normatively innocent into normatively guilty is no minor feat promissory standards pull off. Yet wherein rests their authority? The position I defend – the exhaustive practice position or EPP for short – claims that the authority of those standards entirely rests in promissory practices; no justification flows to promissory norms from any practice-independent order. What would that mean for our promissory commitments? Some have worried that if true EPP would undermine our promissory commitments; rendering them unsustainable without the assurance that promissory standards are sanctioned by some practice-external authority. My paper seeks to dislodge this concern, arguing that EPP offers a selfaffirmative rather than self-defeating interpretation of promissory practices. • Comments: Shawn Kaplan (Adelphi) • Session 7, Room 2 26. Andrew Johnson (Missouri State): “The Trouble with Kant’s Humanity Formula” Abstract: The trouble with Kant’s Humanity Formula is that it is either incomplete, requiring supplementation by an additional moral principle, or implausible. In the Humanity Formula we can distinguish a positive requirement, that we always treat The trouble with Kant’s Humanity Formula is that it is either incomplete, requiring supplementation by an additional moral principle, or implausible. In the Humanity Formula we can distinguish a positive requirement, that we always treat RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 9 | P a g e persons as ends, and a negative requirement, that we never treat persons as mere means. Fulfilling the positive requirement, Kant tells us, entails adopting others’ ends as our own. But this is a plausible demand only if the others’ ends are morally permissible. So the positive requirement must be supplemented by a criterion of permissible ends. If the Humanity Formula is to be a complete moral principle in itself, this criterion must be supplied by its negative requirement. I examine three interpretations of the negative requirement, each of which is suggested by Kant’s false-promising example and has been advocated by a leading Kantian ethicist. None of these interpretations, I argue, yields a plausible moral principle. • Comments: Steve Sverdlik (SMU) • Session 6, Room 2 27. Andrew Jordan (U Washington): “Virtues, Particularism, and Reasons for Action” • Comments: Frans Svensson (Uppsula/Arizona) • Session 10, Room 4 28. Paul Katsafanas (New Mexico): “Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency” Abstract: Lately, a number of philosophers have argued that agents can be more and less active in the production of their own actions. Some actions—principally reflective, deliberative ones—are said to involve agential activity; other actions— principally unreflective, non-deliberative ones—are said to be brought about in a more passive fashion. In this essay, I critique these claims. I show that philosophers employing the notion of agential activity have relied on one or more of the following claims, which have not been clearly distinguished in the literature: (1) that choice causes action, (2) that motives do not determine choice, and (3) that reflective deliberation suspends the effects of motives. I argue that while there are precisifications of the first and second claims that render them true, the third claim is false. Moreover, I argue that the third claim is the crucial one; its truth is necessary in order to support the idea that reflective agency is paradigmatically active. As a result, the traditional accounts of agential activity must be rejected. I close by suggesting a new model of agential activity. Lately, a number of philosophers have argued that agents can be more and less active in the production of their own actions. Some actions—principally reflective, deliberative ones—are said to involve agential activity; other actions— principally unreflective, non-deliberative ones—are said to be brought about in a more passive fashion. In this essay, I critique these claims. I show that philosophers employing the notion of agential activity have relied on one or more of the following claims, which have not been clearly distinguished in the literature: (1) that choice causes action, (2) that motives do not determine choice, and (3) that reflective deliberation suspends the effects of motives. I argue that while there are precisifications of the first and second claims that render them true, the third claim is false. Moreover, I argue that the third claim is the crucial one; its truth is necessary in order to support the idea that reflective agency is paradigmatically active. As a result, the traditional accounts of agential activity must be rejected. I close by suggesting a new model of agential activity. • Comments: Lisa Damm (UCSD) • Session 17, Room 1 29. Daniel Kelly (Purdue): “The Ethics of Disgust” Abstract: I argue that the recent debate about the role disgust deserves in ethical thought has been impoverished by an inadequate understanding of the emotion itself. After considering Kass and Nussbaum’s respective positions in that debate, and the implausible views of the nature of disgust on which their arguments rest, I describe my own view, which makes sense of the wealth of recent, often puzzling, empirical work done on the emotion. This view sees disgust as being primarily responsible for protecting against toxins and infectious diseases, but then recruited to play auxiliary roles in the cognition of social norms and group boundaries. I argue that this view provides new and more plausible foundations for skepticism about the idea that disgust deserves some kind of special epistemic credit or moral authority, that the emotion is a trustworthy guide to justifiable moral judgments, or that there is any deep wisdom in repugnance. I argue that the recent debate about the role disgust deserves in ethical thought has been impoverished by an inadequate understanding of the emotion itself. After considering Kass and Nussbaum’s respective positions in that debate, and the implausible views of the nature of disgust on which their arguments rest, I describe my own view, which makes sense of the wealth of recent, often puzzling, empirical work done on the emotion. This view sees disgust as being primarily responsible for protecting against toxins and infectious diseases, but then recruited to play auxiliary roles in the cognition of social norms and group boundaries. I argue that this view provides new and more plausible foundations for skepticism about the idea that disgust deserves some kind of special epistemic credit or moral authority, that the emotion is a trustworthy guide to justifiable moral judgments, or that there is any deep wisdom in repugnance. • Comments: Johann Klaassen (First Affirmative Financial Network, LLC) RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 10 | P a g e • Session 12, Room 3 30. Brent Kious (UCLA): “Impermissibility, Consent, Coercion” • Comments: Eric Chwang (CU-Boulder) • Session 8, Room 1 31. Charlie Kurth (UCSD): “Fashion Models and Moral Realists” Abstract: I argue that reflection on our fashion discourse reveals serious problems for a prominent form of argument for naturalistic moral realism. This “analogy argument,” as used by Peter Railton, David Brink, and others, claims that we have reason to endorse realism about moral properties in virtue of the similarities that our moral discourse has with the sciences. While many question the extent to which morality is analogous with science, my case is significant because it demonstrates that the realists’ strategy of seeking parallels with science fails to support a claim to moral realism even if we grant that moral discourse is analogous to science: Because paradigmatically constructivist discourses like fashion evince the same parallels with science, there’s no reason to take the analogy between morals and science as evidence for moral realism. In fact, our fashion discourse suggests that moral properties may be better understood on a constructivist model. I argue that reflection on our fashion discourse reveals serious problems for a prominent form of argument for naturalistic moral realism. This “analogy argument,” as used by Peter Railton, David Brink, and others, claims that we have reason to endorse realism about moral properties in virtue of the similarities that our moral discourse has with the sciences. While many question the extent to which morality is analogous with science, my case is significant because it demonstrates that the realists’ strategy of seeking parallels with science fails to support a claim to moral realism even if we grant that moral discourse is analogous to science: Because paradigmatically constructivist discourses like fashion evince the same parallels with science, there’s no reason to take the analogy between morals and science as evidence for moral realism. In fact, our fashion discourse suggests that moral properties may be better understood on a constructivist model. • Comments: Julie Van Kamp (CSU-Long Beach) • Session 3, Room 3 32. Christian Lee (CU-Boulder): “Grounding Evaluative Properties” Abstract: In order to compute intrinsic value we must isolate evaluatively basic states of affairs. In this essay, I offer a characterization of evaluatively basic states of affairs. This task involves developing accounts of intrinsicness, the formation of states of affairs, and metaphysical grounding. The idea will be that evaluatively basic states of affairs are those that ground the intrinsic values of states of affairs. This view is contrasted with others, and I spend time considering one view recently advanced by Zimmerman (2001). I argue that the view defended here avoids problems his and other accounts face. I end by considering two applications of this view to two outstanding problems in value theory. In order to compute intrinsic value we must isolate evaluatively basic states of affairs. In this essay, I offer a characterization of evaluatively basic states of affairs. This task involves developing accounts of intrinsicness, the formation of states of affairs, and metaphysical grounding. The idea will be that evaluatively basic states of affairs are those that ground the intrinsic values of states of affairs. This view is contrasted with others, and I spend time considering one view recently advanced by Zimmerman (2001). I argue that the view defended here avoids problems his and other accounts face. I end by considering two applications of this view to two outstanding problems in value theory. • Comments: George Backen (Adams State) • Session 10, Room 3 33. Clayton Littlejohn (UT-San Antonio): “Psychologism Strikes Back (and Out)” Abstract: In this paper, I shall argue for a thesis about the ontology of reasons; namely that some reasons for action are facts or states of affairs. I shall also address two arguments for a psychologized conception of normative reasons, the view that identifies reasons with states of mind or the contents of those states. The first asserts that only psychologism can accommodate some important intuitions about rational action and normative judgment. The second asserts that only a kind of psychologism respects the explanatory constraint that says that motivating and normative reasons belong to the same ontological categories. I hope to show that neither argument is sound. In this paper, I shall argue for a thesis about the ontology of reasons; namely that some reasons for action are facts or states of affairs. I shall also address two arguments for a psychologized conception of normative reasons, the view that identifies reasons with states of mind or the contents of those states. The first asserts that only psychologism can accommodate some important intuitions about rational action and normative judgment. The second asserts that only a kind of psychologism respects the explanatory constraint that says that motivating and normative reasons belong to the same ontological categories. I hope to show that neither argument is sound. • Comments: Tom Bradley (Iowa) • Session 1, Room 4 RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 11 | P a g e 34. Kris McDaniel (Syracuse): “The Metaphysics of Axiology and the Welfare of Animals” • Comments: Sara Bernstein (Arizona/UNC-Chapel Hill) • Session 9, Room 3 35. Jonas Olson (Stockholm): “In Defense of Moral Error Theory” Abstract: Moral error theorists accept two claims—one conceptual and one ontological—about moral facts. The conceptual claim is that moral facts are or entail facts about categorical reasons (and correspondingly that moral claims are or entail claims about categorical reasons); the ontological claim is that there are no categorical reasons—and consequently no moral facts—in reality. Hence first-order moral claims are uniformly false. In this paper I defend moral error theory against three recent challenges. The first and most basic is that moral error theory is incoherent since it entails first-order moral claims that, by its own lights, are false. The second challenge, due to Stephen Finlay, maintains that the conceptual claim is false and hence that the error moral error theorists claim to find in ordinary moral discourse is a chimera. The third challenge is that the ontological claim has implausibly wide ramifications. Moral error theorists accept two claims—one conceptual and one ontological—about moral facts. The conceptual claim is that moral facts are or entail facts about categorical reasons (and correspondingly that moral claims are or entail claims about categorical reasons); the ontological claim is that there are no categorical reasons—and consequently no moral facts—in reality. Hence first-order moral claims are uniformly false. In this paper I defend moral error theory against three recent challenges. The first and most basic is that moral error theory is incoherent since it entails first-order moral claims that, by its own lights, are false. The second challenge, due to Stephen Finlay, maintains that the conceptual claim is false and hence that the error moral error theorists claim to find in ordinary moral discourse is a chimera. The third challenge is that the ontological claim has implausibly wide ramifications. • Comments: Matt Bedke (Arizona) • Session 8, Room 3 36. Martin Peterson (Technical University of Eindhoven): “A Computer Simulation of the Argument from Disagreement” Abstract: We offer new support to the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to test in a computer simulation. According to this argument, widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicate that there are no objective and epistemically accessible moral facts. Surprisingly, our simulation shows that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit by moral facts, we would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were affected by factors such as false authorities, external political shifts, and random processes. Therefore, since no such consensus has been reached, the simulation gives us increased reason to take seriously the Argument from Disagreement. It is important to emphasize that this result is neither empirical nor analytical: the computer simulation enables us to discover hidden but deductively valid conclusions that follow from a set of independently plausible premises, although no human being is able to actually grasp all the intermediate steps of the deduction. We offer new support to the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to test in a computer simulation. According to this argument, widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicate that there are no objective and epistemically accessible moral facts. Surprisingly, our simulation shows that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit by moral facts, we would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were affected by factors such as false authorities, external political shifts, and random processes. Therefore, since no such consensus has been reached, the simulation gives us increased reason to take seriously the Argument from Disagreement. It is important to emphasize that this result is neither empirical nor analytical: the computer simulation enables us to discover hidden but deductively valid conclusions that follow from a set of independently plausible premises, although no human being is able to actually grasp all the intermediate steps of the deduction. • Comments: Michael Rubin (Western Australia-Perth) • Session 7, Room 3 37. Matt Pianalto (Truman State): “Moral Conviction and Character” Abstract: We often praise people of integrity, who honor their convictions in the face of adversity and practice what they preach. We admire people who have the courage to take a stand. However, strong moral convictions can also motivate atrocious acts. I argue that moral conviction itself—qua moral conviction—has instrumental value that is connected to its relationship to integrity and courage, and explore three things—reflectiveness, willingness to provide reasons and elucidation, and basic humility—that must accompany moral convictions in order to ensure that they are held responsibly, and which thus mitigate the inherent riskiness of believing with conviction. I also suggest that such moral convictions have a social RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 12 | P a g e value and thus that the value of moral convictions is not limited to the important (if instrumental) roles they play within the life of the individual. • Comments: Julia Driver (Wash U) • Session 11, Room 2 38. Matjaž Potrč and Vojko Strahovnik (U Ljubljana, Slovenia): “The Meinongian Theory of Moral Judgments” Abstract: Meinong held it that there exist genuine ought-beliefs underpinning moral judgment. A neo-Meinongian theory of moral judgment based upon ought-beliefs is presented first. Moral judgments are held to be genuine beliefs possessing constitutive moral phenomenology. The phenomenology of intentionality thesis underlies this approach. It is thereby opposed to treating intentionality and phenomenology in a separate manner. The very possibility of ought-beliefs as a special kind conflicts with beliefs’ restriction to their just descriptive role. This allows for an interesting metaethical combination of cognitivism and expressivism. Meinongian ought-beliefs come naturally as a separate kind in the Brentanian sequence of psychological phenomena. Their independent position is underlined by Meinong’s introduction of their correlated objects. But the dependency conception needs to have its cognitive plausibility straightened out. Meinong held it that there exist genuine ought-beliefs underpinning moral judgment. A neo-Meinongian theory of moral judgment based upon ought-beliefs is presented first. Moral judgments are held to be genuine beliefs possessing constitutive moral phenomenology. The phenomenology of intentionality thesis underlies this approach. It is thereby opposed to treating intentionality and phenomenology in a separate manner. The very possibility of ought-beliefs as a special kind conflicts with beliefs’ restriction to their just descriptive role. This allows for an interesting metaethical combination of cognitivism and expressivism. Meinongian ought-beliefs come naturally as a separate kind in the Brentanian sequence of psychological phenomena. Their independent position is underlined by Meinong’s introduction of their correlated objects. But the dependency conception needs to have its cognitive plausibility straightened out. • Comments: Beth Tropman (Colorado State) • Session 6, Room 3 39. Ryan Preston (UNC-Chapel Hill): “Faith in Humanity” Abstract: I argue for two main claims: First, I argue that a morally good person will have a qualified form of faith in humanity, a qualified tendency to believe that people are morally decent and to expect them to behave in decent ways. Second, I consider some implications of this view for the ethics of public and political life. I argue that, if having such faith is part of being morally good, then politicians and others whose lives are exposed to public scrutiny owe it to the public to lead lives that will not undermine people’s faith. That is, they owe it to the public to lead morally decent lives. So, for example, when a politician has a sordid affair that is thrown into the media spotlight, he wrongs the public in an important sense, whether or not his private misconduct has a negative effect on his job performance. I argue for two main claims: First, I argue that a morally good person will have a qualified form of faith in humanity, a qualified tendency to believe that people are morally decent and to expect them to behave in decent ways. Second, I consider some implications of this view for the ethics of public and political life. I argue that, if having such faith is part of being morally good, then politicians and others whose lives are exposed to public scrutiny owe it to the public to lead lives that will not undermine people’s faith. That is, they owe it to the public to lead morally decent lives. So, for example, when a politician has a sordid affair that is thrown into the media spotlight, he wrongs the public in an important sense, whether or not his private misconduct has a negative effect on his job performance. • Comments: Sarah Stroud (McGill) • Session 10, Room 1 40. Jason Raibley (CSU-Long Beach): “Health and Well Being” • Comments: Jennifer Hawkins (Toronto) • Session 16, Room 2 41. Rebecca Reilly-Cooper (Manchester): “Emotions in Public Reason” Abstract: In this paper I examine the appropriate role for emotion and sentiment in public reason and the justification of political principles. Many Kantian theories of public justification and democratic deliberation are weakened by their purely rationalistic understanding of the ideals of impartiality and reciprocity, as well as by their neglect of the role played by affect and emotion in securing our assent to the validity of norms. In this paper I argue that emotion, sentiment and other affective modes of consciousness have a central role to play not merely in illuminating our In this paper I examine the appropriate role for emotion and sentiment in public reason and the justification of political principles. Many Kantian theories of public justification and democratic deliberation are weakened by their purely rationalistic understanding of the ideals of impartiality and reciprocity, as well as by their neglect of the role played by affect and emotion in securing our assent to the validity of norms. In this paper I argue that emotion, sentiment and other affective modes of consciousness have a central role to play not merely in illuminating our RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 13 | P a g e values and motivating us to act in accordance with them, but also in the formation of those values. It is not only that emotions can help to reveal what reasons we have to act; emotions can also help to constitute those reasons, and in themselves provide us with reasons which can justify our norms and principles. • Comments: Hallie Liberto (Wisc-Madison) • Session 12, Room 1 42. Mark van Roojen (Nebraska-Lincoln): “Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments” Abstract: Extant moral intuitionists are foundationalists. They claim that intuition provides noninferentially justified beliefs to serve as regress stoppers, and as constraints on otherwise coherent moral views. Their critics have mounted empirical attacks on the reliability of intuition. If irrelevant framing effects change what we intuit, intuition is not reliable enough to justify belief in the propositions it offers up. I suggest that intuitionists should admit that plausible candidates for intuitively justified propositions lack justification sufficient for belief absent coherence with other propositions of similar status. Even so such intuitively justified propositions can stop regresses and can serve to decide between two conflicting but coherent views. Intuitionists can admit this while insisting that the inputs from intuition have propositional content, thus handling worries about their ability to enter the space of reasons to justify still further moral claims. Thus the empirical results are compatible with one form of intuitionism. Extant moral intuitionists are foundationalists. They claim that intuition provides noninferentially justified beliefs to serve as regress stoppers, and as constraints on otherwise coherent moral views. Their critics have mounted empirical attacks on the reliability of intuition. If irrelevant framing effects change what we intuit, intuition is not reliable enough to justify belief in the propositions it offers up. I suggest that intuitionists should admit that plausible candidates for intuitively justified propositions lack justification sufficient for belief absent coherence with other propositions of similar status. Even so such intuitively justified propositions can stop regresses and can serve to decide between two conflicting but coherent views. Intuitionists can admit this while insisting that the inputs from intuition have propositional content, thus handling worries about their ability to enter the space of reasons to justify still further moral claims. Thus the empirical results are compatible with one form of intuitionism. • Comments: Amanda Marshall (W Michigan) • Session 14, Room 3 43. Brook Sadler (U South Florida): “Shared Intentions and the Kingdom of Ends” Abstract: Do moral agents as such have a shared intention? Is morality itself a shared cooperative activity? By examining Bratman’s shared intention thesis and Kant’s formula of the kingdom of ends, I offer affirmative answers to both questions. The discussion draws several parallels between Kantian ethics and shared intentionality, revealing a surprising convergence between these two theories. The potential payoff is substantial: an enhanced view of the social dimension of Kantian ethics; a deeper understanding the value of shared governance and of the practical reasoning that shapes shared intentions; and the ability to dislodge still prevalent Hobbesian assumptions about the foundations of morality and sociality. Do moral agents as such have a shared intention? Is morality itself a shared cooperative activity? By examining Bratman’s shared intention thesis and Kant’s formula of the kingdom of ends, I offer affirmative answers to both questions. The discussion draws several parallels between Kantian ethics and shared intentionality, revealing a surprising convergence between these two theories. The potential payoff is substantial: an enhanced view of the social dimension of Kantian ethics; a deeper understanding the value of shared governance and of the practical reasoning that shapes shared intentions; and the ability to dislodge still prevalent Hobbesian assumptions about the foundations of morality and sociality. • Comments: Kalynne Pudner (Auburn) • Session 6, Room 4 44. Jeff Sebo (NYU): “The Personal is Political” Abstract: Why am I free to mess with my future selves more than with you? Why, for example, can I keep myself from drinking tonight, but not keep you from doing the same? In this paper, I argue for a novel answer to this question. I argue that personalities are moral agents: they have duties to each other and rights against each other. So if, as I believe, each person has multiple personalities, then each person is a community of moral agents. And therefore we can look to political philosophy to answer our question: we can say that I can mess with my future selves more than with you for the same reason that we can mess with our fellow citizens more than with foreigners: we disagree about how to live, but we also live Why am I free to mess with my future selves more than with you? Why, for example, can I keep myself from drinking tonight, but not keep you from doing the same? In this paper, I argue for a novel answer to this question. I argue that personalities are moral agents: they have duties to each other and rights against each other. So if, as I believe, each person has multiple personalities, then each person is a community of moral agents. And therefore we can look to political philosophy to answer our question: we can say that I can mess with my future selves more than with you for the same reason that we can mess with our fellow citizens more than with foreigners: we disagree about how to live, but we also live RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 14 | P a g e in the same territory, so we have to work together to find a mutually-acceptable way of life. • Comments: Robyn Gaier (Saint Louis University) • Session 14, Room 4 45. Hanoch Sheinman (Rice): “The Priority of Practice” • Comments: Dierdre Golash (American) • Session 11, Room 4 46. Saul Smilansky (Haifa): “How Repugnant is the Repugnant Conclusion? A Reply to Michael Huemer” Abstract: In "In Defence of Repugnance" (Mind 2008), Michael Huemer seeks to defend the Repugnant Conclusion. Of crucial importance is Huemer's claim that the RC turns out in the end to be "congenial in practice". I argue that Huemer does not succeed in making the Repugnant Conclusion congenial. I show that he seems unduly optimistic even in terms of Total Utility, but the main problem is that he does not properly distinguish between two pertinent ideals, which I will call the ideal of Utility Maximization (UM) and the ideal of Beneficiary Maximization (BM). Once we have this distinction in proper focus, we see that Huemer's strongest arguments support the latter. I then show why this means that matters may be even more repugnant than previously realized. In "In Defence of Repugnance" (Mind 2008), Michael Huemer seeks to defend the Repugnant Conclusion. Of crucial importance is Huemer's claim that the RC turns out in the end to be "congenial in practice". I argue that Huemer does not succeed in making the Repugnant Conclusion congenial. I show that he seems unduly optimistic even in terms of Total Utility, but the main problem is that he does not properly distinguish between two pertinent ideals, which I will call the ideal of Utility Maximization (UM) and the ideal of Beneficiary Maximization (BM). Once we have this distinction in proper focus, we see that Huemer's strongest arguments support the latter. I then show why this means that matters may be even more repugnant than previously realized. • Comments: Michael Huemer (CU-Boulder) • Session 15, Room 2 47. Matthew Noah Smith (Yale): “The fact-sensitivity of political principles” Abstract: What is the nature of justification in moral and political philosophy? G.A. Cohen has argued that any fact-principle pair (F1,P1) in which the fact justifies the principle, demands explanation. This explanation, in turn, must take the form of another principle, P2, unrelated to (F1, P1), except insofar as P2 explains the way that F1 justifies P1. This, Cohen believes, immediately generates a regress that can only be stopped by appeal to a fact-insensitive principle, i.e., a principle that is not justified by a fact. Thus, Cohen argues that the dependence or in-virtue-of relationship manifested in justification in moral and political philosophy cannot, at root, involve appeal to facts. In this paper, I argue that Cohen is wrong and I do so by articulating an account of justification that treats the demands of justification as following from the nature of the principles being justified. What is the nature of justification in moral and political philosophy? G.A. Cohen has argued that any fact-principle pair (F1,P1) in which the fact justifies the principle, demands explanation. This explanation, in turn, must take the form of another principle, P2, unrelated to (F1, P1), except insofar as P2 explains the way that F1 justifies P1. This, Cohen believes, immediately generates a regress that can only be stopped by appeal to a fact-insensitive principle, i.e., a principle that is not justified by a fact. Thus, Cohen argues that the dependence or in-virtue-of relationship manifested in justification in moral and political philosophy cannot, at root, involve appeal to facts. In this paper, I argue that Cohen is wrong and I do so by articulating an account of justification that treats the demands of justification as following from the nature of the principles being justified. • Comments: Alex Guerrero (NYU) • Session 16, Room 1 48. Caj Strandberg (UNC-Chapel Hill): “An Internalist Dilemma” Abstract: In this paper, I argue that internalism about moral judgments and motivation faces a dilemma. On the one hand, a strong version of internalism is able to explain our linguistic intuitions as regards the connection between moral language and motivation, but fails to account for the fact that people who suffer from certain mental conditions need not be accordingly motivated. On the other hand, the most plausible version of a weaker form of internalism, rationalist internalism, avoids this difficulty, but fails to explain our linguistic intuitions. Moreover, I argue that externalism can account for the first notion by employing In this paper, I argue that internalism about moral judgments and motivation faces a dilemma. On the one hand, a strong version of internalism is able to explain our linguistic intuitions as regards the connection between moral language and motivation, but fails to account for the fact that people who suffer from certain mental conditions need not be accordingly motivated. On the other hand, the most plausible version of a weaker form of internalism, rationalist internalism, avoids this difficulty, but fails to explain our linguistic intuitions. Moreover, I argue that externalism can account for the first notion by employing RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 15 | P a g e Grice’s concept of generalized conversational implicature and that this view is able to account for the second notion as well. Consequently, there is reason to think that externalism is preferable to internalism. • Comments: Sharon Sytsma (Northern Illinois) • Session 5, Room 3 49. Jussi Suikkanen (Leeds): “Act Consequentialism and Options” Abstract: According to traditional forms of act-consequentialism, we are always required to do the action which would have the best consequences in the given circumstances of the actions which we could do. It has been objected that this view does not leave enough freedom to choose between actions which we intuitively think are morally permissible but not required options for us. I will first go through the previous consequentialist responses to this objection, and why I think those responses are not completely satisfactory. I will then attempt to argue that agents have more options on consequentialist grounds than the traditional forms of actconsequentialism acknowledged. This is because having a choice between many permissible options can itself make things go better. According to traditional forms of act-consequentialism, we are always required to do the action which would have the best consequences in the given circumstances of the actions which we could do. It has been objected that this view does not leave enough freedom to choose between actions which we intuitively think are morally permissible but not required options for us. I will first go through the previous consequentialist responses to this objection, and why I think those responses are not completely satisfactory. I will then attempt to argue that agents have more options on consequentialist grounds than the traditional forms of actconsequentialism acknowledged. This is because having a choice between many permissible options can itself make things go better. • Comments: Brian Berkey (Berkeley) • Session 3, Room 2 50. Sharon Sytsma (Northern Illinois): “The ‘Best and Most Irrefutable’ Ethical Internalism” Abstract: I defend a ‘radical’ version of cognitive internalism that avoids the common criticisms leveled by externalism and is free from the fatal ambiguities inherent in extant versions of internalism. The version is formulated as follows: “For all x, if x is a moral agent, and if x makes a sincere, authentic and genuine moral judgment that y is a moral requirement, then, it is existentially necessary that x has a sufficient motive to fulfill y.” Precising definitions of all italicized terms are provided, and as well as explanations for why this version of internalism successfully avoids criticisms leveled by Frankena, Brink, Mele, Lockie, Roskies, Strandberg (presenting at this conference) and others. With an allusion to Plato (to be explained), I call this version the “best and most irrefutable” ethical internalism. I defend a ‘radical’ version of cognitive internalism that avoids the common criticisms leveled by externalism and is free from the fatal ambiguities inherent in extant versions of internalism. The version is formulated as follows: “For all x, if x is a moral agent, and if x makes a sincere, authentic and genuine moral judgment that y is a moral requirement, then, it is existentially necessary that x has a sufficient motive to fulfill y.” Precising definitions of all italicized terms are provided, and as well as explanations for why this version of internalism successfully avoids criticisms leveled by Frankena, Brink, Mele, Lockie, Roskies, Strandberg (presenting at this conference) and others. With an allusion to Plato (to be explained), I call this version the “best and most irrefutable” ethical internalism. • Comments: Caroline Arruda (Stony Brook) • Session 9, Room 4 51. Sergio Tenenbaum (Toronto): “Intention and Commitment” Abstract: The pre-Bratman orthodoxy classifies as instrumentally rational any agent who, in light of her beliefs, chooses in each particular occasion the action that best satisfies her desires. Bratman argues that such views are incomplete given the facts about our limited rationality; they do not take account of the importance that future-directed intentions have in the lives of agents of limited resources. According to Bratman, no theory of instrumental rationality is complete if we do not add to it rational principles governing future-directed intentions. But once we put this way we realize that Bratman’s argument is not primarily directed against belief-desire psychology, or any view that connects desires with reasons. Bratman’s arguments should work against any view of instrumental rationality that does not provide a proper place for future-directed intentions. It is my aim to the paper to argue that this point is incorrect; future-directed intentions play no role in the theory of instrumental rationality. The pre-Bratman orthodoxy classifies as instrumentally rational any agent who, in light of her beliefs, chooses in each particular occasion the action that best satisfies her desires. Bratman argues that such views are incomplete given the facts about our limited rationality; they do not take account of the importance that future-directed intentions have in the lives of agents of limited resources. According to Bratman, no theory of instrumental rationality is complete if we do not add to it rational principles governing future-directed intentions. But once we put this way we realize that Bratman’s argument is not primarily directed against belief-desire psychology, or any view that connects desires with reasons. Bratman’s arguments should work against any view of instrumental rationality that does not provide a proper place for future-directed intentions. It is my aim to the paper to argue that this point is incorrect; future-directed intentions play no role in the theory of instrumental rationality. RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 16 | P a g e • Comments: Luca Feraro (Wisconsin-Milwaukee) • Session 8, Room 4 52. Mike Valdman (Virginia Commonwealth University): “The Deep Problem with Voluntaristic Theories of Political Obligation” Abstract: Many object to voluntaristic theories of political obligation (consent or reciprocation theories) on the grounds that the actual relationship between citizens and their state is insufficiently voluntary. I argue, however, that such theories would not be able to justify political obligation even if this relationship were unquestionably voluntary. I argue that, on the standard conception of political obligation, one would not acquire a political obligation even by freely promising to obey the law. This, I argue, is because political obligation is largely content-neutral – it is an obligation to obey the law not because of its content but because it was issued by the legitimate political authority – and voluntary acts, whether they involve making promises or accepting benefits, cannot create such content-neutral obligations. Many object to voluntaristic theories of political obligation (consent or reciprocation theories) on the grounds that the actual relationship between citizens and their state is insufficiently voluntary. I argue, however, that such theories would not be able to justify political obligation even if this relationship were unquestionably voluntary. I argue that, on the standard conception of political obligation, one would not acquire a political obligation even by freely promising to obey the law. This, I argue, is because political obligation is largely content-neutral – it is an obligation to obey the law not because of its content but because it was issued by the legitimate political authority – and voluntary acts, whether they involve making promises or accepting benefits, cannot create such content-neutral obligations. • Comments: Jason Wyckoff (Morgan State) • Session 9, Room 1 53. Helga Varden (Illinois, Urbana-Champaign): “The Priority of Rightful Care to Virtuous Care: A Kantian Critique of the Care Tradition” Abstract: Contemporary liberal theories of justice have been rightly criticized for two things. First, they have either neglected private care relations altogether or they have failed to deal with the inherent (inter)dependency, asymmetry and particularity constitutive of these relations. Second, regarding systemic care relations, liberal theories have been shown unable properly to address the asymmetry and dependency constitutive of care workers’ and care receivers’ conditions. The care tradition has been central to identifying these problems in liberal theories. Nevertheless, I argue that current care theories actually reproduce similar problems. The reason is that much liberal theory and the care tradition agree on the assumption that good care requires only virtuous private individuals. Once we rightly give up this assumption, we can solve the problems in private care relations by seeing why rightful care is prior to virtuous care, and we obtain the tools needed to address the issues of systemic injustice. Contemporary liberal theories of justice have been rightly criticized for two things. First, they have either neglected private care relations altogether or they have failed to deal with the inherent (inter)dependency, asymmetry and particularity constitutive of these relations. Second, regarding systemic care relations, liberal theories have been shown unable properly to address the asymmetry and dependency constitutive of care workers’ and care receivers’ conditions. The care tradition has been central to identifying these problems in liberal theories. Nevertheless, I argue that current care theories actually reproduce similar problems. The reason is that much liberal theory and the care tradition agree on the assumption that good care requires only virtuous private individuals. Once we rightly give up this assumption, we can solve the problems in private care relations by seeing why rightful care is prior to virtuous care, and we obtain the tools needed to address the issues of systemic injustice. • Comments: Claudia Mills (CU-Boulder) • Session 10, Room 2 54. Manuel Vargas (U San Francisco): “Desert and Moral Responsibility” Abstract: Pereboom, among others, thinks that something he calls "basic desert" is what is at stake in ordinary attributions of moral responsibility, and he thinks that it is very unlikely to ever obtain. Either Pereboom is wrong about the notion of desert properly involved in responsibility attributions or he is wrong about whether it likely obtains. Either way, he's wrong and I'm right. To show why, I sketch a “post-social” notion of desert that plausibly obtains with some frequency, and is both adequate to our ordinary practices and sensitive to the normative demands that properly govern ascriptions of moral responsibility. I then use this account to show why Pereboom cannot be right about basic desert. Pereboom, among others, thinks that something he calls "basic desert" is what is at stake in ordinary attributions of moral responsibility, and he thinks that it is very unlikely to ever obtain. Either Pereboom is wrong about the notion of desert properly involved in responsibility attributions or he is wrong about whether it likely obtains. Either way, he's wrong and I'm right. To show why, I sketch a “post-social” notion of desert that plausibly obtains with some frequency, and is both adequate to our ordinary practices and sensitive to the normative demands that properly govern ascriptions of moral responsibility. I then use this account to show why Pereboom cannot be right about basic desert. • Comments: Pete Graham (UMass-Amherst) RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 17 | P a g e • Session 12, Room 4 55. Justin Weinberg (South Carolina): “Capability Satisficing: Doing Enough for Future People” Abstract: What moral ideas should guide choices between actions that will affect distant future generations? Because our choices will determine which particular future people will exist, any answer to this question must confront Parfit’s nonidentity problem (NIP)—the problem of explaining the wrongness of an act that leaves people with worthwhile lives somewhat badly off when that act was a necessary condition of those particular people coming into existence. Utilitarian principles avoid the NIP, but face other important criticisms. Here, I put forward “capability satisficing” (CS) as an account of how we should act in respect to future generations. By combining a non-maximizing form of consequentialism with a robust conception of the good based on the capabilities approach of Nussbaum and Sen, CS successfully responds to the NIP, matches our intuitions in specific cases, dodges the difficulties of utilitarianism and other maximizing theories, and avoids objections to other forms of satisficing. What moral ideas should guide choices between actions that will affect distant future generations? Because our choices will determine which particular future people will exist, any answer to this question must confront Parfit’s nonidentity problem (NIP)—the problem of explaining the wrongness of an act that leaves people with worthwhile lives somewhat badly off when that act was a necessary condition of those particular people coming into existence. Utilitarian principles avoid the NIP, but face other important criticisms. Here, I put forward “capability satisficing” (CS) as an account of how we should act in respect to future generations. By combining a non-maximizing form of consequentialism with a robust conception of the good based on the capabilities approach of Nussbaum and Sen, CS successfully responds to the NIP, matches our intuitions in specific cases, dodges the difficulties of utilitarianism and other maximizing theories, and avoids objections to other forms of satisficing. • Comments: Nick Espinoza (Swedish Defense Research Agency) • Session 17, Room 4 56. Henry West (Macalester): “Value Realism and Moral Constructivism” Abstract: Moral realists claim that there are natural rights or natural laws with natural duties. Skeptics say that there are no rights or duties in nature, that morality is a social construction. In this paper I argue that the skeptics are right regarding moral facts in nature—there are no moral natural laws or rights, but I claim that there are value facts in nature. Pleasure and pain, at least, are intrinsically good and intrinsically bad. Thus value realism is true. And it is on that basis that morality can and must be constructed. Morality is properly based on the relationship between the facts of pleasure and pain—value reality—and the nonmoral facts of social and psychological science. I give some arguments against moral realism, and I defend value realism. Then I explore some of the characteristics of a well-constructed morality. Moral realists claim that there are natural rights or natural laws with natural duties. Skeptics say that there are no rights or duties in nature, that morality is a social construction. In this paper I argue that the skeptics are right regarding moral facts in nature—there are no moral natural laws or rights, but I claim that there are value facts in nature. Pleasure and pain, at least, are intrinsically good and intrinsically bad. Thus value realism is true. And it is on that basis that morality can and must be constructed. Morality is properly based on the relationship between the facts of pleasure and pain—value reality—and the nonmoral facts of social and psychological science. I give some arguments against moral realism, and I defend value realism. Then I explore some of the characteristics of a well-constructed morality. • Comments: Avram Hiller (Portland State) • Session 2, Room 3 57. Eric Wielenberg (DePauw): “On the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality” Abstract: Some seek to debunk morality this way: P1. If S’s moral belief that P can be given an evolutionary explanation, then S’s moral belief that P can be explained without appealing to the truth of P. P2. If S’s moral belief that P can be explained without appealing to the truth of P, then S’s moral belief that P lacks warrant. P3. If S’s moral belief that P lacks warrant, then S’s moral belief that P is not knowledge. C. Therefore, if S’s moral belief that P can be given an evolutionary explanation, then S’s moral belief that P is not knowledge. I sketch a possible evolutionary explanation for some human moral beliefs. Then I argue against P2 on the grounds that true beliefs produced by sufficiently reliable processes constitute knowledge, and belief that P can be produced by a sufficiently reliable process even when the belief can be explained without appealing to the truth of P. Some seek to debunk morality this way: P1. If S’s moral belief that P can be given an evolutionary explanation, then S’s moral belief that P can be explained without appealing to the truth of P. P2. If S’s moral belief that P can be explained without appealing to the truth of P, then S’s moral belief that P lacks warrant. P3. If S’s moral belief that P lacks warrant, then S’s moral belief that P is not knowledge. C. Therefore, if S’s moral belief that P can be given an evolutionary explanation, then S’s moral belief that P is not knowledge. I sketch a possible evolutionary explanation for some human moral beliefs. Then I argue against P2 on the grounds that true beliefs produced by sufficiently reliable processes constitute knowledge, and belief that P can be produced by a sufficiently reliable process even when the belief can be explained without appealing to the truth of P. RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 18 | P a g e • Comments: Brad Monton (CU-Boulder) • Session 1, Room 3 58. Reginald Williams (Bakersfield College): “Global Poverty: A Long-Term Approach” Abstract: This paper presents a new account of how to reduce global poverty, and of the moral basis for doing so. I argue that if humans have a right not to be severely poor, as Pogge has helped to establish in the literature, the world’s severely poor should be relocated to nearby societies with existing infrastructure which can be expanded, and affluent nations should finance this as much as they can. To defend this position, I present an analogy, according to which the world’s severely poor should be seen as economic refugees and thus assisted in relocating to societies that will respect their right not to be severely poor. This paper presents a new account of how to reduce global poverty, and of the moral basis for doing so. I argue that if humans have a right not to be severely poor, as Pogge has helped to establish in the literature, the world’s severely poor should be relocated to nearby societies with existing infrastructure which can be expanded, and affluent nations should finance this as much as they can. To defend this position, I present an analogy, according to which the world’s severely poor should be seen as economic refugees and thus assisted in relocating to societies that will respect their right not to be severely poor. • Comments: Lisa Fuller (Albany) • Session 11, Room 1 59. Christopher Woodard (U Nottingham): “The Common Structure of Kantianism and Act Consequentialism” Abstract: I claim that Kantian ethics and Act Consequentialism share a common structure since both are theories of pattern-based reasons. I explain the idea of pattern-based reasons, and explain the features shared in common by any theory of them. I then explain why Kantian ethics and Act Consequentialism are properly regarded as such theories, and why it is helpful to view them this way. For example, doing so helps explain Kantian endorsement of exceptionless duties, and also helps to explain an important contrast between the stances these views take towards other agents. My claim is not a version of the Consequentializing Idea. According to that idea, the common structure of Act Consequentialism and Kantian ethics is Act Consequentialism itself. According to my proposal, these views share a structure that is more complex and more abstract than Act Consequentialism. Arguably, this way of conceiving Kantian ethics does less violence to it. I claim that Kantian ethics and Act Consequentialism share a common structure since both are theories of pattern-based reasons. I explain the idea of pattern-based reasons, and explain the features shared in common by any theory of them. I then explain why Kantian ethics and Act Consequentialism are properly regarded as such theories, and why it is helpful to view them this way. For example, doing so helps explain Kantian endorsement of exceptionless duties, and also helps to explain an important contrast between the stances these views take towards other agents. My claim is not a version of the Consequentializing Idea. According to that idea, the common structure of Act Consequentialism and Kantian ethics is Act Consequentialism itself. According to my proposal, these views share a structure that is more complex and more abstract than Act Consequentialism. Arguably, this way of conceiving Kantian ethics does less violence to it. • Comments: Arthur Ward (Bowling Green) • Session 8, Room 2 60. Fiona Woollard (U Sheffield): “A Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing” • Comments: Kai Draper (Delaware) • Session 9, Room 2 RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 19 | P a g e Poster Presentations: 1. Roksana Alavi (S Texas): “Capabilities as Rights Generating” Abstract: Martha Nussbaum argues that the capabilities approach is a better way than rights to address injustices. She adopts the talk of rights only to bring about the idea of having the autonomy to choose which capabilities one wants to develop. However, I argue that human individuals’ capabilities are the basis for rights. I believe that capabilities generate rights. That is if person x has the potential ability, y, then x must have the right to develop y as long as the development of y does not violate another’s development of his or her capabilities. I will point out how the capabilities-based rights theory might answer some of the concerns of traditionally understood theories of rights. Martha Nussbaum argues that the capabilities approach is a better way than rights to address injustices. She adopts the talk of rights only to bring about the idea of having the autonomy to choose which capabilities one wants to develop. However, I argue that human individuals’ capabilities are the basis for rights. I believe that capabilities generate rights. That is if person x has the potential ability, y, then x must have the right to develop y as long as the development of y does not violate another’s development of his or her capabilities. I will point out how the capabilities-based rights theory might answer some of the concerns of traditionally understood theories of rights. 2. Anna Karin Andersson (Stockholm): “Self-Ownership and Equality of Opportunity” 3. Caroline Arruda (Stony Brook): “By Reason and Reason Alone: Do Present Actions Necessitate Future Commitments?” Abstract: A central problem for conceiving of ourselves as rational agents is whether we must, in judging that we are obligated to undertake an action, also seek to undertake other actions that are entailed by or are consistent with it. In my presentation, I argue that decisions to φ, made on the basis of reasons that we take to be good, necessarily commit us to undertaking actions that are consistent with it in the future. I show that we necessarily make future commitments by virtue of engaging in rational action, and not exclusively because we seek to act consistently over time. These commitments are requirements of practical reason due to the way in which our attitudes (e.g., beliefs, intentions, desires) form a background for our decision-making. I conclude by addressing three objections to my argument. A central problem for conceiving of ourselves as rational agents is whether we must, in judging that we are obligated to undertake an action, also seek to undertake other actions that are entailed by or are consistent with it. In my presentation, I argue that decisions to φ, made on the basis of reasons that we take to be good, necessarily commit us to undertaking actions that are consistent with it in the future. I show that we necessarily make future commitments by virtue of engaging in rational action, and not exclusively because we seek to act consistently over time. These commitments are requirements of practical reason due to the way in which our attitudes (e.g., beliefs, intentions, desires) form a background for our decision-making. I conclude by addressing three objections to my argument. 4. Jennifer Baker (College of Charleston): “Operationalizing Virtue” 5. Brian Berkey (UC Berkeley): “On Achieving Justice: Partiality and the Problem of Transition” Abstract: Many of us believe that the extent of existing inequalities is unjust, and therefore that such inequalities ought to be reduced. But we are also inclined to believe that it is permissible for individuals to have and act on strong partial attachments, for example commitments to family, friends, and personal projects. I examine a prominent strategy, deriving from Rawls, that has been employed to attempt to reconcile these thoughts, and suggest that it is unlikely to succeed. I claim that with respect to unjust circumstances we must accept a set of demands such that full compliance will bring about a just result, and suggest that this constraint cannot plausibly be met by the Rawlsian strategy. I then argue that a problem with the same structure applies not only to distributive justice, but to all aspects of justice, and conclude by suggesting that if my argument is correct, we have reason to reconsider common commitments regarding permissible partiality. Many of us believe that the extent of existing inequalities is unjust, and therefore that such inequalities ought to be reduced. But we are also inclined to believe that it is permissible for individuals to have and act on strong partial attachments, for example commitments to family, friends, and personal projects. I examine a prominent strategy, deriving from Rawls, that has been employed to attempt to reconcile these thoughts, and suggest that it is unlikely to succeed. I claim that with respect to unjust circumstances we must accept a set of demands such that full compliance will bring about a just result, and suggest that this constraint cannot plausibly be met by the Rawlsian strategy. I then argue that a problem with the same structure applies not only to distributive justice, but to all aspects of justice, and conclude by suggesting that if my argument is correct, we have reason to reconsider common commitments regarding permissible partiality. 6. Zac Cogley (UCLA): “Trust and the Trickster Problem” Abstract: In this paper, I articulate and defend a conception of trust that solves what I call “the trickster problem.” The problem results from the fact that most accounts of trust treat it similar to, or identical with, relying on someone’s good will. But a trickster like Bernie Madoff could rely on your good will to get you to go along with his scheme, without trusting you to do so. I argue that the clearest cases In this paper, I articulate and defend a conception of trust that solves what I call “the trickster problem.” The problem results from the fact that most accounts of trust treat it similar to, or identical with, relying on someone’s good will. But a trickster like Bernie Madoff could rely on your good will to get you to go along with his scheme, without trusting you to do so. I argue that the clearest cases RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 20 | P a g e of trust are found within the confines of important, normatively defined relationships and that this shows us that there is a normative element to trust. Trusting involves believing that, at least in a certain domain of interaction, you are entitled to rely on that person’s good will; the other party owes you good will. This account solves the trickster problem, because a trickster like Bernie Madoff is not entitled to his victim’s good will. 7. Lisa Damm (UCSD): “Psychopathy, Autism, and Moral Agency” Abstract: Strawsonian inspired accounts of moral responsibility focus on the capacities and competence of the agent typically in terms of a motivational and an epistemological component. However, this focus is directed from the perspective of those who are already inside the moral community peering out to examine whether other potential members should be admitted. I argue that the perspective of the agent themselves imposes an additional requirement on moral agency such that the individual must additionally possess the capacity to desire both membership in the moral community and the motivation to engage with moral reasons and judgments. I further argue that neither individuals with psychopathy nor autism satisfy this proposed desire based criterion for moral agency. Given the strong conceptual links among theories of moral judgment, moral agency, moral community, and moral responsibility I then discuss the implications of these conclusions for accounts of moral judgment. Strawsonian inspired accounts of moral responsibility focus on the capacities and competence of the agent typically in terms of a motivational and an epistemological component. However, this focus is directed from the perspective of those who are already inside the moral community peering out to examine whether other potential members should be admitted. I argue that the perspective of the agent themselves imposes an additional requirement on moral agency such that the individual must additionally possess the capacity to desire both membership in the moral community and the motivation to engage with moral reasons and judgments. I further argue that neither individuals with psychopathy nor autism satisfy this proposed desire based criterion for moral agency. Given the strong conceptual links among theories of moral judgment, moral agency, moral community, and moral responsibility I then discuss the implications of these conclusions for accounts of moral judgment. 8. Dan Demetriou (Minnesota-Morris): “Honor Ethics: An Introduction and Rehabilitation” 9. Lisa Fuller (Albany): “Knowing Their Own Good: Preferences and Liberty in Global Ethics” Abstract: According to Ann Cudd, liberalism contains a fundamental tension, since “[p]rotecting or maximizing liberty seems to involve increasing the chances that individuals will be able to choose what they prefer, but enhancing the freedom of the individual sometimes requires thwarting individuals’ immediate preferences.” Work by Susan Okin (and others) resolves this problem as it relates to oppressed groups in developing countries, by suggesting that many oppressed individuals exhibit attitudes and behavior consistent with adaptive preferences, which means that their preferences run contrary to their real interests in many situations. I argue against this thesis. Instead, I argue that that regardless of the particular culture to which someone belongs, she as capable of assessing her own interests as well as anyone ever is, which is to say, somewhat imperfectly. Therefore, we ought to protect the liberty of oppressed people by taking their actual preferences seriously as plausible indications of what would improve their overall well-being, rather than paternalistically recommending social reforms and aid programs that are organized around someone else’s idea of what is good for them. According to Ann Cudd, liberalism contains a fundamental tension, since “[p]rotecting or maximizing liberty seems to involve increasing the chances that individuals will be able to choose what they prefer, but enhancing the freedom of the individual sometimes requires thwarting individuals’ immediate preferences.” Work by Susan Okin (and others) resolves this problem as it relates to oppressed groups in developing countries, by suggesting that many oppressed individuals exhibit attitudes and behavior consistent with adaptive preferences, which means that their preferences run contrary to their real interests in many situations. I argue against this thesis. Instead, I argue that that regardless of the particular culture to which someone belongs, she as capable of assessing her own interests as well as anyone ever is, which is to say, somewhat imperfectly. Therefore, we ought to protect the liberty of oppressed people by taking their actual preferences seriously as plausible indications of what would improve their overall well-being, rather than paternalistically recommending social reforms and aid programs that are organized around someone else’s idea of what is good for them. 10. Robyn Gaier (Saint Louis U): “Normative Reasons and the Moral (Monster) Problem” Abstract: Moral monsters are not only unmotivated to act morally, but they also fail to appreciate normative reasons for acting. One way in which this failure is explained is through appealing to moral rationalism. It may be claimed, for instance, that the moral monster is being practically irrational when he fails to appreciate a normative reason for action. Michael Smith offers support for this kind of explanation by adopting an anti-Humean account of normative reasons in his book The Moral Problem. Attention to the moral psychology of moral monsters, Moral monsters are not only unmotivated to act morally, but they also fail to appreciate normative reasons for acting. One way in which this failure is explained is through appealing to moral rationalism. It may be claimed, for instance, that the moral monster is being practically irrational when he fails to appreciate a normative reason for action. Michael Smith offers support for this kind of explanation by adopting an anti-Humean account of normative reasons in his book The Moral Problem. Attention to the moral psychology of moral monsters, RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 21 | P a g e most notably Adolf Eichmann, suggests that this understanding of normative reasons is inadequate, however. 11. Dierdre Golash (American U): “Is Polyamory Wrong?” 12. Soroya Gollop (Southern Methodist University): “The Emancipation of Reason: How Intrinsic Desires can be Irrational” 13. Fred Harrington (Wisconsin-Madison): “Consequentialist Rights and the Rightholder as the Source of Duties” Abstract: Disagreement exists over which, if any, moral rights we have. One means that can help determine and justify which moral rights we have is by establishing their theoretical underpinnings. In this paper, I examine the plausibility of one prominent type of proposed grounding for moral rights: consequentialist groundings. Much has been written about whether consequentialist groundings of rights can accommodate the peremptory force, or “trumping” feature, of rights. I explore a different feature of rights that presents a challenge to consequentialist groundings of rights, namely, the rightholder as the primary source of the associated duties of others. I offer a novel critique that, even if some consequentialist theories can accommodate the peremptory force of rights, any consequentialist theory that aggregates across individuals cannot accommodate this second feature of rights. I conclude that there are insurmountable conceptual barriers to consequentialist groundings of moral rights. Disagreement exists over which, if any, moral rights we have. One means that can help determine and justify which moral rights we have is by establishing their theoretical underpinnings. In this paper, I examine the plausibility of one prominent type of proposed grounding for moral rights: consequentialist groundings. Much has been written about whether consequentialist groundings of rights can accommodate the peremptory force, or “trumping” feature, of rights. I explore a different feature of rights that presents a challenge to consequentialist groundings of rights, namely, the rightholder as the primary source of the associated duties of others. I offer a novel critique that, even if some consequentialist theories can accommodate the peremptory force of rights, any consequentialist theory that aggregates across individuals cannot accommodate this second feature of rights. I conclude that there are insurmountable conceptual barriers to consequentialist groundings of moral rights. 14. Vaughn Huckfeldt (South Dakota): “Prudence, Commitments, and Intertemporal Conflicts” 15. Shawn Kaplan (Adelphi): “A Critique of Two Arguments for Indiscriminate Terrorism” Abstract: This paper critically examines two distinct arguments from extremity that attempt to either justify or excuse indiscriminate terrorism and argues that both arguments fail. First, the strong communitarian assumptions of Michael Walzer’s “supreme emergency” argument are drawn out and shown to be the source of unreasonable limits upon his emergency ethics. In addition, the vagueness of these communitarian premises permits an expansive set of excuses for indiscriminate terrorism that far exceed Walzer’s intent. In contrast, Uwe Steinhoff’s uses a liberal, rule-utilitarian framework to establish a “justifying emergency” that permits the weak to resort to indiscriminate terrorism. This approach is unsuccessful as the likelihood of severe retaliation and the escalation of indiscriminate violence towards total warfare makes his rule-utilitarian justification untenable. The paper concludes that a comparative analysis of threatened versus actual rights violations would be more successful in justifying weaker forms of indiscriminate terrorism than either argument from extremity. This paper critically examines two distinct arguments from extremity that attempt to either justify or excuse indiscriminate terrorism and argues that both arguments fail. First, the strong communitarian assumptions of Michael Walzer’s “supreme emergency” argument are drawn out and shown to be the source of unreasonable limits upon his emergency ethics. In addition, the vagueness of these communitarian premises permits an expansive set of excuses for indiscriminate terrorism that far exceed Walzer’s intent. In contrast, Uwe Steinhoff’s uses a liberal, rule-utilitarian framework to establish a “justifying emergency” that permits the weak to resort to indiscriminate terrorism. This approach is unsuccessful as the likelihood of severe retaliation and the escalation of indiscriminate violence towards total warfare makes his rule-utilitarian justification untenable. The paper concludes that a comparative analysis of threatened versus actual rights violations would be more successful in justifying weaker forms of indiscriminate terrorism than either argument from extremity. 16. Doil Kim (Toronto): “Modesty and the Problem of the Ascription of Virtue” Abstract: In this presentation, I question whether what is involved in the firstpersonal exercise of a virtue is always the only determinant of the ascription of a virtue. I aim to show that modesty is a paradigm-case virtue, the ascription of which is not determined merely by identifying the inner working of a person to whom it is ascribable. I argue that how a modest person is typically seen from the secondor third-personal perspective is another fundamental determinant of the ascription of modesty, regardless of how her first-personal exercise is to be justified as virtuous; this explains why this virtue has been understood differently in terms of various inner-workings recently in the literature on it. In this presentation, I question whether what is involved in the firstpersonal exercise of a virtue is always the only determinant of the ascription of a virtue. I aim to show that modesty is a paradigm-case virtue, the ascription of which is not determined merely by identifying the inner working of a person to whom it is ascribable. I argue that how a modest person is typically seen from the secondor third-personal perspective is another fundamental determinant of the ascription of modesty, regardless of how her first-personal exercise is to be justified as virtuous; this explains why this virtue has been understood differently in terms of various inner-workings recently in the literature on it. RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 22 | P a g e 17. Judith Kissell (Creighton): “Moral Complicity and the ‘Appearances’ of Aristotle” Abstract: Moral complicity is one of the richest, most intriguing, and most enigmatic problems in philosophical ethics. The complicitous person, or accomplice, contributes to, but does not cause, the harm in question. This paper is devoted to the notion of moral complicity that thrives in the sayings and stories of our western cultural traditions. I discuss the Aristotelian justification for doing an in-depth ethical analysis from this source, an idea based on Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation of Aristotle’s “appearances” that include the ordinary beliefs and sayings expressed in our public discourse. Complicity is morally compelling because embodied in a persistently familiar moral vocabulary, firmly embedded in our stories, metaphors and maxims. From our earliest literature emerges a rich and fertile language that illustrates it: “washing one's hands”; “turning a blind eye”; “stonewalling,” etc. I examine some of these metaphors of complicity because we can parse their moral richness only there. Moral complicity is one of the richest, most intriguing, and most enigmatic problems in philosophical ethics. The complicitous person, or accomplice, contributes to, but does not cause, the harm in question. This paper is devoted to the notion of moral complicity that thrives in the sayings and stories of our western cultural traditions. I discuss the Aristotelian justification for doing an in-depth ethical analysis from this source, an idea based on Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation of Aristotle’s “appearances” that include the ordinary beliefs and sayings expressed in our public discourse. Complicity is morally compelling because embodied in a persistently familiar moral vocabulary, firmly embedded in our stories, metaphors and maxims. From our earliest literature emerges a rich and fertile language that illustrates it: “washing one's hands”; “turning a blind eye”; “stonewalling,” etc. I examine some of these metaphors of complicity because we can parse their moral richness only there. 18. Johann Klaassen (First Affirmative Financial Network, LLC): “Of Blood and Money: Unintentionally Investing in War” Abstract: In this paper, we argue a very particular point: those who embrace generally non-violent principles ought not to invest their assets in securities which support or profit from military spending. But we will also be arguing a general point: we are morally responsible for, and so have an obligation to be aware of, our economic actions and their consequences. Can we really mean to say that every investor is morally obligated to examine the detailed list of investments made on his behalf by the managers of the mutual funds in his retirement portfolio (say), and to investigate the sources of revenue for each of those hundreds of corporations, in an attempt to ensure that no securities of morally objectionable corporations end up in our hands? Briefly, yes. As shareholders, we have a responsibility to try to govern our corporations so that they do not promote or permit what we take to be immoral. Failing that, we have a responsibility to stop investing in them. In this paper, we argue a very particular point: those who embrace generally non-violent principles ought not to invest their assets in securities which support or profit from military spending. But we will also be arguing a general point: we are morally responsible for, and so have an obligation to be aware of, our economic actions and their consequences. Can we really mean to say that every investor is morally obligated to examine the detailed list of investments made on his behalf by the managers of the mutual funds in his retirement portfolio (say), and to investigate the sources of revenue for each of those hundreds of corporations, in an attempt to ensure that no securities of morally objectionable corporations end up in our hands? Briefly, yes. As shareholders, we have a responsibility to try to govern our corporations so that they do not promote or permit what we take to be immoral. Failing that, we have a responsibility to stop investing in them. 19. Justin Klockseim (Alabama-Tuscaloosa): “Moorean Pluralism as a Solution to Incommensurability” Abstract: A number of prominent and influential moral philosophers, such as Hare, Kekes, Nagel, Nussbaum, Raz, and Stocker, have argued that there are incommensurable values—that values of central moral importance are irreducibly complex and fragmented, and so cannot be legitimately compared or commensurated. This value incommensurability has been thought to have profound implications concerning practical reason, moral deliberation, and the human moral experience. In this paper, I carefully explain what it is for values to be incommensurable, and present two distinct arguments in favor of the incommensurability thesis. I then consider and reject several arguments that incommensurability is impossible, before presenting and defending my own argument against the view that there are incommensurable values. Finally, I will propose that a Moorean version of value pluralism can explain why incommensurability is impossible without doing violence to the underlying intuitions that motivated it in the first place. A number of prominent and influential moral philosophers, such as Hare, Kekes, Nagel, Nussbaum, Raz, and Stocker, have argued that there are incommensurable values—that values of central moral importance are irreducibly complex and fragmented, and so cannot be legitimately compared or commensurated. This value incommensurability has been thought to have profound implications concerning practical reason, moral deliberation, and the human moral experience. In this paper, I carefully explain what it is for values to be incommensurable, and present two distinct arguments in favor of the incommensurability thesis. I then consider and reject several arguments that incommensurability is impossible, before presenting and defending my own argument against the view that there are incommensurable values. Finally, I will propose that a Moorean version of value pluralism can explain why incommensurability is impossible without doing violence to the underlying intuitions that motivated it in the first place. 20. Amanda Marshall (W Michigan): “Particularist Challenge to Norm Expressivism” Abstract: On Allan Gibbard’s norm expressivism, issuing a moral judgment involves endorsing a set of principles or norms. But moral particularists, such as Jonathan On Allan Gibbard’s norm expressivism, issuing a moral judgment involves endorsing a set of principles or norms. But moral particularists, such as Jonathan RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 23 | P a g e Dancy, self-consciously eschew principles in moral evaluation. Virtually everyone now considers this a coherent option, though it turns out not to be on Gibbard’s view. I develop this problem for norm expressivism, and conclude the position cannot be revised to accommodate particularism without collapsing into a traditional form of expressivism. 21. Peter Nichols (Wisconsin-Madison): “Rethinking the Branch-Line Case: An Objection to Parfit” Abstract: In Derek Parfit’s famous Branch-Line Case, we are asked to imagine that a scanner creates a duplicate of him but leaves behind the original person—call him the “branch-line person”—who will soon die. Parfit argues that the branch-line person should regard his impeding death as almost as good as ordinary survival. Call this normative claim the “Branch-Line Claim.” I argue that the Branch-Line Claim engenders an intolerable consequence: it would not be wrong of someone to kill the branch-line person shortly after duplication, even in a case where the branch-line person would otherwise live a full life. Moreover, I argue that the reasoning Parfit gives in favor of the Branch-Line Claim is deeply flawed. Nevertheless, since the Branch-Line Claim is not integral to Parfit’s theory of survival, I contend that he and like-minded psychological continuity theorists can dispense with this claim at little cost to their preferred theory. In Derek Parfit’s famous Branch-Line Case, we are asked to imagine that a scanner creates a duplicate of him but leaves behind the original person—call him the “branch-line person”—who will soon die. Parfit argues that the branch-line person should regard his impeding death as almost as good as ordinary survival. Call this normative claim the “Branch-Line Claim.” I argue that the Branch-Line Claim engenders an intolerable consequence: it would not be wrong of someone to kill the branch-line person shortly after duplication, even in a case where the branch-line person would otherwise live a full life. Moreover, I argue that the reasoning Parfit gives in favor of the Branch-Line Claim is deeply flawed. Nevertheless, since the Branch-Line Claim is not integral to Parfit’s theory of survival, I contend that he and like-minded psychological continuity theorists can dispense with this claim at little cost to their preferred theory. 22. Jonathan Peterson (Toronto): “Intrinsic Value and the Public Interest in Art” Abstract: Defenders of a public interest in art such as Joel Feinberg and Sarah Harding argue that arts policy may be grounded in the intrinsic value of art. The goal of this paper is to determine whether this intrinsic value argument is sound. The intrinsic value argument claims that artworks, artistic achievements or states involving the contemplation of beauty have intrinsic value. As such there is a reason for each of us to support, promote and protect art and a reason for the state to (coercively) undertake this task on our behalf. I argue that the case for the intrinsic value of art is harder to make out than it might initially seem. I proceed by examining some standard analysis of the concept of intrinsic value and asking how well the concept applies to some interesting cases such as hip hop, haute couture and modern dance. Defenders of a public interest in art such as Joel Feinberg and Sarah Harding argue that arts policy may be grounded in the intrinsic value of art. The goal of this paper is to determine whether this intrinsic value argument is sound. The intrinsic value argument claims that artworks, artistic achievements or states involving the contemplation of beauty have intrinsic value. As such there is a reason for each of us to support, promote and protect art and a reason for the state to (coercively) undertake this task on our behalf. I argue that the case for the intrinsic value of art is harder to make out than it might initially seem. I proceed by examining some standard analysis of the concept of intrinsic value and asking how well the concept applies to some interesting cases such as hip hop, haute couture and modern dance. 23. Kalynne Pudner (Auburn): “Reconceiving the Right to Procreation” 24. Cindy Scheopner (Hawaii): “Disturbing the Dead: Cross Cultural Concerns in Burial Site Relocation” 25. Tony Smith (Minnesota-Mankato): “Do Mothers Have an Obligation to Have Abortions?” Abstract: Most arguments about abortion have centered on whether it is permissible for a mother to have an abortion. I will argue that, in certain cases, it is not only permissible for a mother to have an abortion but that the mother has an obligation to terminate the pregnancy. I argue that when the child would not have a life worth living the mother ought to terminate the pregnancy, i.e. the mother would be wrong not to have an abortion. First, I argue that, in these cases, terminating the pregnancy would not deprive the fetus of a future of value and, therefore, it is permissible to have an abortion. I then argue that terminating the pregnancy of a fetus that would not have a future of value is morally identical to a case where we think we would be wrong not to terminate the life of another individual who does Most arguments about abortion have centered on whether it is permissible for a mother to have an abortion. I will argue that, in certain cases, it is not only permissible for a mother to have an abortion but that the mother has an obligation to terminate the pregnancy. I argue that when the child would not have a life worth living the mother ought to terminate the pregnancy, i.e. the mother would be wrong not to have an abortion. First, I argue that, in these cases, terminating the pregnancy would not deprive the fetus of a future of value and, therefore, it is permissible to have an abortion. I then argue that terminating the pregnancy of a fetus that would not have a future of value is morally identical to a case where we think we would be wrong not to terminate the life of another individual who does RoME: Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2009 24 | P a g e not a future of value. The moral similarities between these two cases are enough to support my conclusion. 26. Sharon Sytsma (Northern Illinois): “The ‘Best and the Most Irrefutable’ Ethical Internalism” Abstract: I defend a ‘radical’ version of cognitive internalism that avoids the common criticisms leveled by externalism and is free from the fatal ambiguities inherent in extant versions of internalism. The version is formulated as follows: “For all x, if x is a moral agent, and if x makes a sincere, authentic and genuine moral judgment that y is a moral requirement, then, it is existentially necessary that x has a sufficient motive to fulfill y.” Precising definitions of all italicized terms are provided, and as well as explanations for why this version of internalism successfully avoids criticisms leveled by Frankena, Brink, Mele, Lockie, Roskies, Strandberg (presenting at this conference) and others. With an allusion to Plato (to be explained), I call this version the “best and most irrefutable” ethical internalism. I defend a ‘radical’ version of cognitive internalism that avoids the common criticisms leveled by externalism and is free from the fatal ambiguities inherent in extant versions of internalism. The version is formulated as follows: “For all x, if x is a moral agent, and if x makes a sincere, authentic and genuine moral judgment that y is a moral requirement, then, it is existentially necessary that x has a sufficient motive to fulfill y.” Precising definitions of all italicized terms are provided, and as well as explanations for why this version of internalism successfully avoids criticisms leveled by Frankena, Brink, Mele, Lockie, Roskies, Strandberg (presenting at this conference) and others. With an allusion to Plato (to be explained), I call this version the “best and most irrefutable” ethical internalism. 27. Bradley Thomas (Iowa): “The Non-Moral Basis of Cognitive Biases of Moral Intuitions” 28. Patrick Todd (UC Riverside): “A New Approach to Manipulation Arguments” 29. Julie Van Camp (CSU Long Beach): “The Ethical Use of Cultural Objects: Proposals from Intellectual Property” Abstract: I explore whether the model of intellectual property, not mere physical property, provides a fruitful paradigm for analysis of the ethical treatment of cultural objects. Intellectual property jurisprudence understands that the protected object is not merely a physical artifact, but also a complex cultural entity. Intellectual property jurisprudence understands that these protections are actually a “bundle” of rights, meaning that the same object might have multiple owners of different aspects of the property, physical and otherwise. Our conceptual ability to distinguish the various aspects of this bundle of rights in copyright and other intellectual property suggests different ways of approaching cultural property rights, whether or not a particular object is technically eligible for a governmental copyright today. I also explore whether the well-established concept of “fair use” can be extended to cultural property, whether or not a particular object qualifies for legal intellectual property protection. I explore whether the model of intellectual property, not mere physical property, provides a fruitful paradigm for analysis of the ethical treatment of cultural objects. Intellectual property jurisprudence understands that the protected object is not merely a physical artifact, but also a complex cultural entity. Intellectual property jurisprudence understands that these protections are actually a “bundle” of rights, meaning that the same object might have multiple owners of different aspects of the property, physical and otherwise. Our conceptual ability to distinguish the various aspects of this bundle of rights in copyright and other intellectual property suggests different ways of approaching cultural property rights, whether or not a particular object is technically eligible for a governmental copyright today. I also explore whether the well-established concept of “fair use” can be extended to cultural property, whether or not a particular object qualifies for legal intellectual property protection. 30. Christina Van Dyke (Calvin College): “Ethical Vegetarianism: Feminist Requirement or Patriarchal Burden?” 31. Arthur Ward (Bowling Green): “Natural Teleology as Protonormativity”