Water Allocation under Asymmetric Climate Information: implications for equity, bargaining and participation in Northeast Brazil
نویسندگان
چکیده
Alexander Pfaff , Sanford School of Public Policy, Economics Department, and Nicholas School of the Environment & Earth Sciences, Duke University Maria Alejandra Velez , School of Management, Andes University Kenneth Broad, University of Miami, Leonard and Jayne Abess Center for Ecosystem Science and Policy, and Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University Renzo Taddei, School of Communication, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro *
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تاریخ انتشار 2009