A necessary and sufficient condition for the convexity in oligopoly games
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the convexity (or supermodularity) in oligopoly games. 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
منابع مشابه
(Average-) convexity of Common Pool and Oligopoly TU-Games
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