More strategies, more Nash equilibria ∗ Sophie Bade
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we isolate a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of strategy spaces and the number of Nash equilibria. This class is that of two-player games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces and continuous and strictly quasi-concave payoff functions, assumptions met by many economic models. We then show that the sufficient conditions for our theorem to hold are tight.
منابع مشابه
More strategies, more Nash equilibria
This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). This class is that of two-player nice games, i.e., games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces and continuous and strictly quasi-concave payoff functions, assumptions met by many economic models. We ...
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