Kitcher’s Modest Realism: the Reconceptualization of Scientific Objectivity

Scientific Realism , the Galilean Strategy and Representation 1

This paper critically reviews Philip Kitcher’s most recent epistemology of science, real realism. I argue that this view is unstable under different understandings of the term “representation”, and that the arguments offered for the position are either unsound or invalid depending on the understanding employed. Suitably modified those arguments are however convincing in favor of a deflationary ...

How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?

Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. In this paper I attempt to understand how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical realism. I do this by going through several distinct (though often related) arguments from disagreement, carefully distinguishing between them, and critically evaluating their merits. ...

Realism, Photography and Journalistic Objectivity in 19th Century America

A Metaethical Option for Theists

John Hare has proposed “prescriptive realism” in an attempt to stake out a middle-ground position in the twentieth century Anglo-American debates concerning metaethics between substantive moral realists and antirealistexpressivists. The account is supposed to preserve both the normativity and objectivity of moral judgments. Hare defends a version of divine command theory. The proposal succeeds ...

An Alternative to Kitcher’s Theory of Conceptual Progress and His Account of the Change of the Gene Concept

The present paper discusses Kitcher’s framework for studying conceptual change and progress. Kitcher’s core notion of reference potential is hard to apply to concrete cases. In addition, an account of conceptual change as change in reference potential misses some important aspects of conceptual change and conceptual progress. I propose an alternative framework that focuses on the inferences and...