Market Mechanisms for Fair Division with Indivisible Objects and Money∗
نویسنده
چکیده
A fair division problem with indivisible objects and money consists of a set of agents, a set of objects, a value matrix which shows the value of each agent for each object and a money endowment to be shared among agents. Each agent has a quasi-linear utility function over objects and money. A solution to a fair division problem is an allocation which assigns an object and a money share to each agent. In this paper, we introduce a family of mechanisms, namely market mechanisms, which determine allocations for each fair division problem. We prove that a market mechanism converges to an envy-free, efficient, Pareto efficient and individually rational solution for each fair division problem using the principles of a tâtonnement process. We formulate underdemanded objects, overdemanded objects and perfectly demanded objects to deÞne the formal money adjustment process in the domain of fair division problems.
منابع مشابه
Market Mechanisms for Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects and Money∗
This paper studies the problem of fair allocation of indivisible objects and money among agents with quasi-linear preferences. A mechanism determines an allocation for each problem. We introduce a class of mechanisms, namely market mechanisms, which use tâtonnement process. We prove that adjustment process converges to an envy-free, efficient, and individually rational allocation. Some interest...
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