On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
This note demonstrates that symmetric 3× 3 supermodular games may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in these games is known to be independent of the noise structure, our result implies that a noise-independent selection in global games may not be a robust equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.
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