Asymptotic Dominant Strategy Truthfulness in Ascending Price Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
At the very beginning of the semester, we saw an incredibly powerful tool in mechanism design: the VCG mechanism. You remember: the VCG mechanism lets us find the welfare-optimal solution for any social choice problem, and pair it with payments that makes truthful reporting of one’s preferences a dominant strategy for every player. Pretty impressive! Yet, one-shot direct revelation mechanisms are rarely used in practice. There are a couple of reasons for this that are commonly cited:
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