Cycling Co-Evolution Resulting from Genetic Adaptation in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider two populations co-evolving with fitness defined by the payoff in a two-person zero-sum game. We show that such situations lead to spontaneous and sustained oscillations iff the optimal strategy of the game is mixed.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Open Syst. Inform. Dynam.
دوره 12 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005