In Broad Daylight: Fuller Information and Higher-Order Punishment Opportunities Can Promote Cooperation

In broad daylight : Full information and higher - order punishment opportunities promote cooperation

The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. In a set of experimental treatments, we find that availability of higherorder punishment increases cooperation and effic...

Online Appendix for Kamei and Putterman , 2013 “ In Broad Daylight : Fuller Information and Higher - order Punishment Opportunities

Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game

The promise of punishment and reward in promoting public cooperation is debatable. While punishment is traditionally considered more successful than reward, the fact that the cost of punishment frequently fails to offset gains from enhanced cooperation has lead some to reconsider reward as the main catalyst behind collaborative efforts. Here we elaborate on the “stick vs. carrot” dilemma by stu...

Consensual punishment does not promote cooperation in the six-person prisoner's dilemma game with noisy public monitoring

We study the effects of different punishment institutions on cooperation in a six-person prisoner's dilemma game in which actors observe others' cooperation with some noise (i.e. imperfect public monitoring). Previous research has shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation, if a certain proportion of group members punish defectors at a cost to themselves. However, in the presence of noi...

Cooperation in social dilemmas: free riding may be thwarted by second-order reward rather than by punishment.

Cooperation among nonrelatives can be puzzling because cooperation often involves incurring costs to confer benefits on unrelated others. Punishment of noncooperators can sustain otherwise fragile cooperation, but the provision of punishment suffers from a "second-order" free-riding problem because nonpunishers can free ride on the benefits from costly punishment provided by others. One suggest...