The core and the bargaining set for convex games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Within the class of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a game is characterized by the coincidence of its core and the steady bargaining set. As a consequence it is also proved that convexity can also be characterized by the coincidence of the core of a game and the modified Zhou bargaining set (Shimomura, 1997)
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