On the nature of the plurality inference: Ladybugs for Anne

Recent explorations in formal pragmatics provide ample argumentation and some experimental support to the claim that plural nominal morphology does not lexically encode plurality but rather triggers a plurality inference of a pragmatic nature (Sauerland 2003, Sauerland, Andersen & Yatsushiro 2005; Spector 2007; Sauerland 2008; Magri 2014, Ivlieva 2013, Tieu et al 2014, Mayr 2015). This claim is based on the observation that plural nominal interpretations do not always entail a reference to more than one individual. Rather, there are certain well-defined configurations in which the meaning of plural nominal expressions is either consistent with an ‘at least one’ reading or even requires that reading. Among these, most discussed are bare plurals in the scope of negation, as in (1b), which disallow the ‘more than one’ interpretation of the same plural in the non-negated counterpart of (1b) in (1a).