A Complexity Result for Undominated-Strategy Implementation
نویسنده
چکیده
We prove that there exist social choice correspondences that can be implemented in undominated strategies, using finite mechanisms, but can require arbitrarily many strategies to do so, even when there are only two agents and two types of each agent. This is in sharp contrast with dominant-strategy implementation, where the revelation principle implies that only one strategy for each type of agent is needed; our result shows that no corresponding simplifying principle can exist for undominated strategies. JEL Classifications: D82, C72, D71
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