Guarding constructivism: the Pl-metaphysics of hegel and naturalists

http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/11/1/148.werner « 13 » These assumptions of separation and connection provide an illustrative example of the relative differences between diametric and concentric spaces as spatial frames for cognition. diametric and concentric structures are necessary spatialrelational conditions for framing the two different constructions of Gilligan’s moral reasoning process. These spatial preunderstandings go beyond binary splits such as mind / body, where distinction can be recognised without being division or reduction to monistic relations of identity. « 14 » These proposed diametric and concentric spaces are argued elsewhere to be precognitive frames for understanding, relational horizons within which cognition is shaped (downes 2012, 2015), pertaining directly also to perception in Jakob von uexküll’s Umwelt (downes 2010b), sought by Werner (§64). a related argument is that much of the information processing paradigm of cognitive science is trapped by Cartesian-newtonian spatial assumptions of passive space as mere non-entity, including in understandings of schema-based explanations (downes 2010a) and alan newell and Herbert simon’s problem-solver computational models (downes 2006, 2010a, 2010c). a wider argument for the importance of diametric and concentric spaces seeks also to challenge traditional understandings of metaphysics (downes 2012, 2013), so interrogation of prior spatial preconditions for understanding may need to go further than being rooted in metaphysical assumptions. « 15 » other entailments of the relative differences between concentric and diametric spaces than assumed connection and assumed separation include those highlighted by Lévi-strauss (1963, 1973). These are diametric structures as mirror-image inverted symmetry and relative closure of non-interaction between foreground and background; in contrast, concentric spatial relations offer symmetry as unity rather than inversion (downes 2012) and a more open structure with background rather than diametric spaces. « 16 » Werner cites von Glasersfeld (1991) on the need to challenge categories of space and time as objective realities (§18). diametric and concentric spaces are argued to be irreducible to simple subjectivism or objectivism (downes 2012); moreover, they do not hinge on Lévi-strauss’s structuralist commitments (downes 2012, 2013). This invites a wider discussion about metaphysical understandings of truth locked into subjectivist-objectivist frames of understanding (downes 2012). « 17 » Werner’s questioning of the roots of radical constructivism, to seek pathways removed from remnants of Cartesian metaphysics, is to be welcomed. These aspects of his argument can gain support through this spatial questioning of prior background diametric and concentric structures of relation that frame cognitive constructs, as prior spatial preconditions as constructions for both thinking and perception.