Ownership Structure, Managerial Behavior and Corporate Value
نویسندگان
چکیده
The nonlinear relationship between corporate value (Tobin's Q) and managerial ownership is well documented. This has commonly been attributed to the onset of managerial entrenchment, which results in a decrease of corporate value for increasing levels of managerial holdings. We propose a more complex structure for the corporate value { managerial ownership function, which accounts for the e®ect of con°icting managerial incentives and external and internal disciplinary monitoring mechanisms. Using this speci ̄cation as the basis for our analysis, we provide evidence that the managerial ownership corporate value relationship is co-deterministic. This ̄nding is at odds with recent work by Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) who report that corporate value determines managerial ownership but not vice-versa.
منابع مشابه
Investigating the effect of ownership structure on banks' risk-taking behavior
The ownership structure is one of the important issues of corporate governance that can affect the efficiency of companies by influencing managerial motivations. The aim of the present study is to investigate the asymmetric effect of ownership structure on bankschr('39') risk-taking behavior. The present study was conducted using the information of twenty-one banks listed on the Tehran Security...
متن کاملتاثیر ساختار مالکیت و ساختار سرمایه بر جریان های نقدی آزاد
یکی از ابزارهای ارزیابی قدرت بازپرداخت بدهی و تعیین انعطاف پذیری مالی شرکتها، شاخص جریان نقد آزاد میباشد. از این روی هدف پژوهش حاضر بررسی تأثیر ساختار مالکیت و ساختار سرمایه بر جریانهای نقد آزاد شرکتهای پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران است. در این پژوهش دو جنبه اساسی ساختار مالکیت شرکتها یعنی ترکیب سهامداران و میزان تمرکز مالکیت مورد بررسی قرار گرفت. ترکیب سهامداران از طریق چهار متغ...
متن کاملThe Impact of Institutional Ownership on the Relationship between Tax and Capital Structure
One of the reasons that companies avoid paying their taxes is that they choose to use debts for their funding. In other words, tax saving, an activity of companies to avoid taxpaying, can be used to finance corporate projects. Furthermore, since institutional owners are more inclined to supervise, they may shrink managerial behaviors to avoid taxpaying. In this study, institutional owners’ supe...
متن کاملThe simultaneous determination of managerial ownership, corporate performance and financial analysts coverage in the United Kingdom By
Various monitoring and incentive mechanisms interact within the context of organizations to encourage management to maximise the value of their firm. Within the context of this paper I explore the interaction between insider ownership, financial analyst coverage and corporate value. I propose that any relationship between these variables is endogenous. However, due to managerial entrenchment an...
متن کاملManagerial Preferences , Corporate Governance , and Financial Structure ∗
Conflicts of interest between insiders (e.g, controlling shareholders) and outsiders (e.g., minority shareholders) are central to the analysis of modern corporation. In an integrated continuous-time contingent claims framework with imperfect corporate governance, we examine a controlling shareholder’s optimal choice of capital structure, ownership concentration, private benefit diversion, consu...
متن کامل