Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players’ decisions according to some optimality criterion. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the best choice problem are given. Several concepts of criteria for selecting a correlated equilibrium are used. 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- European Journal of Operational Research
دوره 184 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008