Oxford Bibliographies Online - Mathematics, Philosophy of

ion principles are crucial for the neo-Fregean. But which principles are acceptable? The notion of stability 11/4/10 10:42 PM Oxford Bibliographies Online Mathematics, Philosophy of Page 9 of 16 http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0069 offers a promising response; roughly speaking, an abstraction principle is acceptable just in case it is satisfiable in all domains of sufficiently large cardinality. Two counterexamples are then offered to stability as a sufficient condition for acceptability, and it is then argued that only with major changes in the neo-Fregean approach can these counterexamples be avoided. Linsky, Bernard, and Edward N. Zalta. “What Is Neologicism?” Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (2006): 60–99. Find this resource: A new version of neo-logicism is developed, within third-order nonmodal object theory, and it is argued that this theory provides a version of neo-logicism that most closely satisfies the central goals of the original logicist program. Rayo, Agustín. “Success by Default?” Philosophia Mathematica 11 (2003): 305–322. Find this resource: It is argued that neo-Fregean accounts of arithmetical knowledge rely on a thesis to the effect that prima facie we are justified in thinking that some stipulations are successful. Given that neo-Fregeans have not yet offered a defense of this thesis, their account has a significant gap. A naturalistic remedy is then provided. Available online. Zalta, Edward N. “Neo-Logicism? An Ontological Reduction of Mathematics to Metaphysics.” Erkenntnis 53 (2000): 219–265. Find this resource: Argues that mathematical objects can be reduced to abstract objects, which in turn can be systematically formulated in a particular axiomatic metaphysical theory that does not presuppose any mathematics. These abstract objects are, in a certain sense, logical objects, introduced by a comprehension principle that seems to be an analytic truth. A new kind of logicism then emerges. Empiricism There are different forms of empiricism in the philosophy of mathematics. Some emphasize the methodological similarities between mathematics and the natural sciences; others stress the non–a priori status of mathematics. Some do both. This is the case in Kitcher 1983, which has advanced the most developed empiricist view in the contemporary scene, focusing on the nature of mathematical knowledge and the analogies between mathematics and science. The methodological similarities are also emphasized in Lakatos 1978, where a broadly Popperian framework is adopted. Bueno 2000 identifies certain patterns of theory change in mathematics and in science, and indicates the relevant similarities between them. A critical assessment of experimental mathematics, and an important challenge for such views, is presented in Baker 2008. Baker attempts to refute the idea that experimental mathematics makes essential use of electronic computers; another insists that it uses inductive support for mathematical hypotheses. Baker, Alan. “Experimental Mathematics.” Erkenntnis 68 (2008): 331–344. Find this resource: A critical examination of experimental mathematics, and a discussion of whether experimental mathematics really challenges the traditional understanding of mathematics as an a priori, nonempirical enterprise. An alternative formulates experimental mathematics in terms of the calculation of instances of some general hypothesis. However, Baker notes, this characterization is compatible with the traditional understanding of mathematics as an a priori discipline. Bueno, Otávio. “Empiricism, Mathematical Change, and Scientific Change.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 31 (2000): 269–296. Find this resource: Offers an empiricist and historically informed model of theory change in which the similarities between theory change in mathematics and in science are articulated and developed. Kitcher, Philip. The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Find this resource: 11/4/10 10:42 PM Oxford Bibliographies Online Mathematics, Philosophy of Page 10 of 16 http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0069 Defends the view that mathematical knowledge is not a priori, and that mathematics is ultimately an empirical science that evolves in time bearing close similarities to the development of the natural sciences. A detailed and historically informed account of how mathematical languages are modified, why certain mathematical questions become prominent, and how standards of proof change is also offered. Lakatos, Imre. Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2, Mathematics, Science, and Epistemology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Find this resource: Particularly in the first part of this collection of papers, careful and thoughtful similarities between the methodology of mathematics and of the natural sciences are explored, within a broadly Popperian framework. In particular, it is argued that mathematics is quasi-empirical and that there are “potential falsifiers” in mathematics. Naturalism There are many naturalist views in the philosophy of mathematics. Some emphasize the continuity between mathematics and science, whereas others stress the importance of being sensitive to mathematical practice (to mention just two possibilities). The most thoroughly developed form of naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics has been articulated in Maddy 1997, with particular attention to set theory, and Maddy 2007, which also includes a naturalist treatment of logic. Several naturalist views combine the defense of naturalism with Platonism. This is the case in Colyvan 2001, as part of the discussion of the indispensability argument, and Linsky and Zalta 1995, which defends Platonized naturalism. Baker 2001 develops a provocative naturalist defense of the indispensability argument (see The Indispensability Argument), arguing for the significance of mathematics in the development of new theories and in the discovery of new results. Baker, Alan. “Mathematics, Indispensability, and Scientific Progress.” Erkenntnis 55 (2001): 85–116. Find this resource: An indirect defense of naturalism, offered on the grounds that even if there were nominalist views that manage to capture the physical consequences of our best scientific theories, this would not be enough to undermine the indispensability argument. After all, in order to develop new theories and discover new results, more mathematical resources are typically required than to derive known theorems. More work is needed to reject the indispensability argument. Colyvan, Mark. The Indispensability of Mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Find this resource: A broadly Quinean and naturalist view in the philosophy of mathematics is articulated, with particular emphasis on the indispensability argument. According to the latter, we ought to be ontologically committed to mathematical objects, given that they are indispensable to our best theories of the world. Linsky, Bernard, and Edward N. Zalta. “Naturalized Platonism vs. Platonized Naturalism.” Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995): 525–555. Find this resource: A defense of Platonized naturalism, the view according to which a certain kind of Platonism is consistent with naturalism. The Platonism in question is characterized by the introduction of general comprehension principles that assert the existence of abstract objects. Knowledge of mathematical truths is linked to knowledge of such comprehension principles. Maddy, Penelope. Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon, 1997. Find this resource: A searching critique of realism in mathematics, with particular emphasis on set theory, and the development of a naturalist alternative, which is then applied to the selection and justification of set-theoretic axioms. Maddy has an impressive command of the relevant literature in both set theory and in the philosophy and history of mathematics. A pleasure to read. Maddy, Penelope. Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method. Oxford: Clarendon, 2007. 11/4/10 10:42 PM Oxford Bibliographies Online Mathematics, Philosophy of Page 11 of 16 http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0069 Find this resource: The most thoroughly developed naturalist view (or “second philosophy,” as Maddy prefers to call it) in the philosophy of mathematics and logic, including careful accounts of the role of mathematics in application, as well as the methodology and the epistemology of mathematics. The Indispensability Argument Significant work in the philosophy of mathematics has been motivated by the indispensability argument. Quine originally formulated the argument, which was then more fully developed in Putnam 1979. Colyvan 2001 offered the most thorough and the first book-length treatment of the indispensability argument, giving the latter an explicit formulation: we ought to be ontologically committed to all (and only) those entities that are indispensable to our best theories of the world; mathematical entities are indispensable to our best theories; therefore, we ought to be ontologically committed to these entities. In an attempt to resist the argument, several responses were advanced. Maddy 1992 argued that the indispensability argument turned out to be incompatible with scientific and mathematical practice. Sober 1993 insisted that, on an account of confirmation based on the likelihood principle, mathematical statements are not confirmed by the observations that support the scientific theories in which such statements occur. To resist these objections, Resnik 1995 offered a pragmatic version of the indispensability argument that does not rely on scientific realism. Azzouni 1997 raised a different challenge to the indispensability argument on the grounds that existential quantification need not require ontological commitment. Melia 2000 identified a practice (that he calls “weaseling”) according to which it is perfectly coherent to quantify over mathematical objects while denying their existence. Baker 2001, in turn, offered a defense of the indispensability argument by noting that in order to develop new theories and discover new results, mathematical objects turn out to be indispensable. Azzouni, Jody “Applied Mathematics, Existential Commitment, and the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Thesis.” Philosophia Mathematica 5 (1997): 193–209. Find this resource: A critique of the indispensability argument is advanced on the grounds that when scientific theories are regimented, existential quantification—even if the latter is interpreted objectually rather than substitutionally—does not entail ontological commitment. A thorough development of this critique is presented in Azzouni 2004 (cited under Nominalism). Baker, Alan. “Mathematics, Indispensability, and Scientific Progress.” Erkenntnis 55 (2001): 85–116. Find this resource: Defends the indispensability argument by arguing that even if there were nominalist views that manage to capture the physical consequences of our best scientific theories, this would not be enough to undermine the indispensability argument. After all, according to Baker, in order to develop new theories and discover new results, we need more mathematical resources than to derive known theorems. More work is then required to reject the indispensability argument. Colyvan, Mark. The Indispensability of Mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Find this resource: A careful and systematic defense of the indispensability argument, according to which we ought to be ontologically committed to only those objects that are indispensable to our best theories of the world; given that mathematical objects are indispensable, we ought to be ontologically committed to them. A broadly Quinean and naturalist view in the philosophy of mathematics is then thoroughly articulated. Maddy, Penelope. “Indispensability and Practice.” Journal of Philosophy 89 (1992): 275–289. Find this resource: A provocative critique of the indispensability argument on the grounds that it is ultimately inconsistent with scientific and mathematical practice. For further developments, see Maddy 1997 (cited under Naturalism). Melia, Joseph. “Weaseling Away the Indispensability Argument.” Mind 109 (2000): 455–480. Find this resource: 11/4/10 10:42 PM Oxford Bibliographies Online Mathematics, Philosophy of Page 12 of 16 http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0069 The indispensability argument is resisted via a strategy that allows the nominalist to quantify over abstract objects while denying their existence—a practice that is called “weaseling.” It is then argued that such a practice is coherent, unproblematic, and rational. Putnam, Hilary. “Philosophy of Logic.” In Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2, Mathematics, Matter, and Method. 2d ed. Edited by Hilary Putnam, 323–357.Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Find this resource: A clear statement of the indispensability argument, insisting that given that quantification over mathematical objects is indispensable to science, the commitment to the existence of these objects follows. As Putnam notes, Quine originally formulated the argument. Resnik, Michael D. “Scientific vs. Mathematical Realism: The Indispensability Argument.” Philosophia Mathematica 3 (1995): 166–174. Find this resource: A pragmatic indispensability argument is formulated in order to overcome the objections that were raised by Sober 1993 and Maddy 1992 to the confirmational indispensability argument. The pragmatic argument favors mathematical realism independently of scientific realism. For further developments, see Resnik 1997 (cited under Structuralism). Sober, Elliott “Mathematics and Indispensability.” Philosophical Review 102 (1993): 35–57. Find this resource: A searching critique of the indispensability argument by invoking contrastive empiricism and the likelihood principle, according to which an observation O favors a hypothesis H1 over H2 if the conditional probability of O given H1 is higher than the conditional probability of O given H2. It is then argued that mathematical statements are not confirmed by the observations that support the scientific theories in which such statements occur. The Application of Mathematics The application of mathematics has generated significant philosophical work. Azzouni 2000 gave consideration to the effect that there is no genuine philosophical problem in the success of applied mathematics. Colyvan 2001 defended the opposing view, insisting that the application of mathematics does yield a genuine problem, which neither fictionalists (such as Field) nor platonists (such as Quine) are able to solve. This disagreement notwithstanding, nominalist accounts of the application of mathematics have been offered in Azzouni 2004 and Bueno 2005. Pincock 2004 examines the strengths and weaknesses of so-called mapping accounts of the application of mathematics, and Batterman 2009 argues that mapping accounts are ultimately unable to accommodate idealizations in physical theorizing. Finally, Pincock 2007 advances a new account of a role for mathematics in the physical sciences, emphasizing the epistemic benefits of mathematics in scientific theorizing. Azzouni, Jody. “Applying Mathematics: An Attempt to Design a Philosophical Problem.” Monist 83 (2000): 209–227. Find this resource: Consideration is given to the effect that there is no genuine philosophical problem in the success of applied mathematics (for an opposing view, see Colyvan 2001). Once particular attention is given to implicational opacity— our inability to see, before a proof is offered, the consequences of various mathematical statements—much of the alleged surprise in the successful application of mathematics should vanish. Azzouni, Jody. Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Find this resource: The second part of this book offers an extremely original account of applied mathematics, including an examination of the epistemic burdens that posits bear, the connections between posits and existence, as well as a careful discussion of two models of applying mathematics, and the relations between applied mathematics and ontology. Batterman, Robert W. “On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science.” British Journal for 11/4/10 10:42 PM Oxford Bibliographies Online Mathematics, Philosophy of Page 13 of 16 http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0069 the Philosophy of Science (2009): 1–29. Find this resource: A critical assessment of contemporary attempts to make sense of the explanatory role of mathematics in empirical science, and a critique of the so-called mapping accounts of the relations between mathematical structures and the physical world. It is argued that these accounts are unable to accommodate the use of idealizations in physical theorizing. A new approach to the application of mathematics is then advanced. Available online. Bueno, Otávio. “Dirac and the Dispensability of Mathematics.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 36 (2005): 465–490. Find this resource: A case is made for the dispensability of mathematics in the context of applied mathematics, by adapting some of the resources presented in Azzouni 2004, with particular emphasis on the various uses of mathematics that Dirac articulated in his work in quantum mechanics. Colyvan, Mark. “The Miracle of Applied Mathematics.” Synthese 127 (2001): 265–277. Find this resource: It is argued that the application of mathematics to science presents a genuine problem (for an opposing view, see Azzouni 2000). In particular, it is argued that two major philosophical accounts of mathematics—Field’s mathematical fictionalism and Quine’s Platonist realism—are unable to explain the problem. It is then suggested that the problem cuts across the realism/antirealism debate in the philosophy of mathematics. Pincock, Christopher “A New Perspective on the Problem of Applying Mathematics.” Philosophia Mathematica 12 (2004): 135–161. Find this resource: A framework for discussing the problem of the application of mathematics is presented, and an account in terms of this framework advanced. In particular, the framework offers resources to assess the strengths and weaknesses of an approach to the application of mathematics in terms of mappings between the physical world and a mathematical domain. Available online. Pincock, Christopher “A Role for Mathematics in the Physical Sciences.” Noûs 41 (2007): 253–275. Find this resource: A new account of a role for mathematics in the physical sciences is offered, and the epistemic benefits of mathematics in scientific theorizing are emphasized. In particular, the account brings together the theoretical indispensability of mathematics (the latter’s significance in scientific theorizing) and the metaphysical dispensability of mathematical objects (given that the latter play no causal role in the physical world). Pictures and Proofs in Mathematics Proofs play a crucial role in mathematics. Detlefsen 1992a offers a collection of papers that explore the connections between proofs and mathematical knowledge, whereas Detlefsen 1992b brings together essays on the relations between proofs, justification, and formalization. A highly original account of mathematical proof (the derivation-indicator view) is developed in Azzouni 2006. A significant related issue is the role of pictures in proofs. Brown 1997 argues that pictures have a positive evidential role, and supports the point with historical considerations and striking examples. The most thorough philosophical study of visual thinking in mathematics is presented in Giaquinto 2007, whereas Mancosu, et al. 2005 collects some papers on visualization and mathematical reasoning (including some work by Brown and Giaquinto). Azzouni, Jody. Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Find this resource: The second part of this book offers a highly original account of mathematical proof, including an examination of what makes mathematics unique as a social practice, the development of the derivation-indicator view of mathematical practice, and an account of how to nominalize mathematical formalism. Brown, James Robert. “Proofs and Pictures.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1997): 161– 11/4/10 10:42 PM Oxford Bibliographies Online Mathematics, Philosophy of Page 14 of 16 http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0069 180. Find this resource: It is argued that pictures have a positive evidential role in mathematics, and that they are more than just psychologically or heuristically useful. Historical considerations and striking examples are offered in support of this view. Detlefsen, Michael, ed. Proof and Knowledge in Mathematics. London: Routledge, 1992a. Find this resource: A collection of papers by prominent philosophers of mathematics focusing on the connections between proof and knowledge in mathematics, including discussions of proof as a source of truth, logicism, the concept of proof in elementary geometry, and Brouwerian intuitionism. Detlefsen, Michael, ed. Proof, Logic, and Formalization. London: Routledge, 1992b. Find this resource: A collection of papers by leading philosophers of mathematics and of logic on the relations between proof, justification, and formalization, including discussions of what is a proof, proof and epistemic structure, arithmetical truth, the impredicativity of induction, and the alleged refutation of Hilbert’s program using Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. Giaquinto, Marcus. Visual Thinking in Mathematics: An Epistemological Study. Oxford: Clarendon, 2007. Find this resource: A thorough and insightful account of visual thinking in mathematics. Giaquinto argues that visual thinking often has an epistemological role in mathematics, and in some cases it offers a means of discovery. The proposal is supported by case studies from geometry, algebra, arithmetic, and real analysis, and it draws on philosophical work on the nature of concepts, as well as empirical studies of visual perception, numerical cognition, and mental imagery. Mancosu, Paolo, Klaus Frovin Jørgensen, and Stig Andur Pedersen, eds. Visualization, Explanation, and Reasoning Styles in Mathematics. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2005. Find this resource: The first part of this excellent collection has some papers on visualization and mathematical reasoning, which examine visualization in logic and mathematics (in particular, geometry), as well as the significance of pictures and proofs to platonic intuitions, and a thoughtful account of mathematical activity. Mathematical Practice An important trend in the philosophy of mathematics emerged from the examination of philosophical issues that arise from mathematical practice. Lakatos 1976 offers a particularly insightful treatment of mathematical practice in the context of the dynamics of proofs and refutations. An extremely original approach to various puzzles that emerge from mathematical practice is developed in Azzouni 1994. Mancosu 1996 offers a careful discussion of mathematical practice in the 17th century, whereas the papers collected in Mancosu 2008 and Mancosu, et al. 2005 clearly illustrate the rich source of insight that mathematical practice offers when close attention is paid to it. Azzouni, Jody. Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice: The Ontology and Epistemology of the Exact Sciences. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Find this resource: A highly original and insightful treatment of some puzzles raised by mathematical practice, and a careful examination of the role played by mathematical terms and empirical terms in actual scientific and mathematical practice. Lakatos, Imre. Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Find this resource: 11/4/10 10:42 PM Oxford Bibliographies Online Mathematics, Philosophy of Page 15 of 16 http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0069 A careful study of the vagaries of a mathematical conjecture regarding the classification of polyhedra (first formulated by Euler), and the series of proofs and refutations that it engendered. The main text is written as a dialogue in an imaginary classroom, while the footnotes reconstruct some aspects of the actual history. Along the way, the struggles of actual mathematical practice are insightfully rendered and analyzed. Mancosu, Paolo. Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Find this resource: A careful and detailed examination of philosophy of mathematics and mathematical practice in the 17th century. Mancosu, Paolo, ed. The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Oxford: Clarendon, 2008. Find this resource: An excellent collection of papers on various philosophical aspects of mathematical practice by leading philosophers in the field. Some of the issues examined include diagrammatic reasoning and visualization in mathematics, mathematical explanation, the ideal of purity and mathematical proof, the role of computers in mathematical inquiry, and the philosophical import of recent developments in mathematical physics. Mancosu, Paolo, Klaus Frovin Jørgensen, and Stig Andur Pedersen, eds. Visualization, Explanation, and Reasoning Styles in Mathematics. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2005. Find this resource: All the papers in this excellent collection illustrate the insights that can be gained about mathematics when close attention is given to mathematical practice, from the connections between visualization and mathematical reasoning through different proof styles to the significance that mathematical explanation and understanding have to mathematical activity. Mathematical Explanation Explanations in mathematics offer an important source of philosophical reflection. Careful and up-to-date surveys of mathematical explanation can be found in Mancosu 2008a and Mancosu 2008b; the latter is freely available online. One significant issue is whether there are genuine mathematical explanations in science. Baker 2005 defends the claim that there are, and offers a detailed example from evolutionary biology in support of his case. Colyvan 2002 also supports the existence of mathematical explanations, and argues that the use of complex numbers unifies not only the mathematical theory of differential equations but also the various physical theories that use such equations. Hafner and Mancosu 2008 offers a critique of the unification account of mathematical explanation, whereas Sandborg 1998 criticizes van Fraassen’s account of explanation by invoking examples of mathematical explanation. An excellent collection of papers that deal, in part, with mathematical explanation is Mancosu, et al. 2005. Baker, Alan. “Are There Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena?” Mind 114 (2005): 223–238. Find this resource: It is argued that there are genuine mathematical explanations in science. To support this point, a detailed example from evolutionary biology, involving periodical cicadas, is given. Consequences that favor the indispensability argument are then drawn. Colyvan, Mark. “Mathematics and Aesthetic Considerations in Science.” Mind 111 (2002): 69–74. Find this resource: A case is made for the claim that mathematics unifies a great deal of scientific theorizing, and thus it has a significant explanatory role. In support of this case, the use of complex numbers to unify not only the mathematical theory of differential equations but also the various physical theories that use such equations is explored. Hafner, Johannes, and Paolo Mancosu. “Beyond Unification.” In The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Edited by Paolo Mancosu, 151–178. Oxford: Clarendon, 2008. Find this resource: 11/4/10 10:42 PM Oxford Bibliographies Online Mathematics, Philosophy of Page 16 of 16 http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0069 A critique of the unification account of mathematical explanation, on the grounds that such an account makes predictions about explanatory power that conflict with certain cases from mathematical practice. Mancosu, Paolo “Mathematical Explanation: Why It Matters.” In The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Edited by Paolo Mancosu, 134–150. Oxford: Clarendon, 2008a. Find this resource: An insightful and up-to-date discussion of mathematical explanation and its significance. Mancosu, Paolo “Explanation in Mathematics.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. 2008b. A careful and up-to-date survey of explanation in mathematics, covering two main problems: (1) whether mathematics plays an explanatory role in the empirical sciences, and (2) whether mathematical explanations occur within mathematics. The connections between the two problems and their relevance are also explored. Mancosu, Paolo, Klaus Frovin Jørgensen, and Stig Andur Pedersen, eds. Visualization, Explanation, and Reasoning Styles in Mathematics. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2005. Find this resource: Some of the papers collected in the second part of this volume deal explicitly with mathematical explanation—in particular, the connections between explanation, proof style, and understanding in mathematics are examined, and different kinds of mathematical explanation are discussed and assessed. Sandborg, David. “Mathematical Explanation and the Theory of Why-Questions.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1998): 603–624. Find this resource: A provocative critique of van Fraassen’s account of explanation in terms of why-questions based on examples of mathematical explanation. In particular, it is argued that van Fraassen’s account cannot recognize mathematical proofs as explanatory, and an example is given of an explanation that seems to be explanatory even though it is unable to answer the why-question that motivated it. Last Modified: 05/10/2010 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0069 back to top Oxford University Press Copyright © 2010 Oxford University Press | Privacy Policy | Legal Notice