The Cognitive Demands of Intellectual Virtue

My plan in this paper is to defend a 'cognitive requirement' on intellectual virtue. I shall argue that part of what is involved with possessing an intellectual virtue is having a certain cognitive perspective on or belief about the disposition in question. The argument will shed light on two main aspects of intellectual virtue. First, it will illuminate the positive psychological substance or character of intellectual virtue. Second, it will clarify the relation between the cognitive dimension of intellectual virtue and various other widely acknowledged features of virtue proper. I begin by clarifying how I am thinking about intellectual virtues and saying something about the motivation for my project. As I am conceiving of them, intellectual virtues are intellectual character traits like fair-mindedness, open-mindedness, inquisitiveness, attentiveness, carefulness and thoroughness in inquiry, and intellectual honesty, courage, integrity, and the like. They are not hardwired cognitive capacities or faculties on the model of vision, memory, introspection, and the like. 1 Furthermore, on the present conception, intellectual virtues are 'personal excellences,' meaning that they are traits that make their possessor good or admirable qua person. 2 This way of thinking about intellectual virtues, while perhaps not entirely familiar, should be familiar and intuitive enough. We often admire persons who are, for instance, reflective and thoughtful about important questions, careful and thorough in their reasoning, and willing to listen honestly and charitably 'to the other side,' not merely (if at all) because these