Should equilibria require that players are uninformed? Arguing against the Trigger Strategy and Simple Optimal Penal Code in Repeated Matching Games
نویسنده
چکیده
In repeated matching games trigger strategies and simple optimal penal codes are not equilibria unless strong informational assumptions are made. If only local information is used by the strategy and other weak information ows are allowed both strategies fail.
منابع مشابه
Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games
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