Pavlo Blavatskyy Back to the St . Petersburg Paradox ? CERGE - EI
نویسندگان
چکیده
Conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory do not explain the St. Petersburg paradox. To do so, the power coefficient of an individual’s utility function must be lower than the power coefficient of an individual’s probability weighting function. Abstrakt: Konvenční parametrizace kumulativní prospektové teorie nevysvětlují Petrohradský paradox. K tomu je zapotřebí, aby mocnitel jedincovy užitkové funkce byl nižší než mocnitel jeho pravděpodobnostní váhové funkce.
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