Running head: CENTIPEDE GAMES Rationality and Backward Induction in Centipede Games
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Running head: REASONS FOR COOPERATING Reasons for Cooperating in Repeated Interactions: Social Value Orientations, Fuzzy Traces, Reciprocity, and Activity Bias
Many human interactions involve patterns of turn-taking cooperation that can be modeled by the deeply paradoxical Centipede game. A backward induction argument suggests that cooperation is irrational in such interactions, but experiments have demonstrated that players cooperate frequently and earn better payoffs as a consequence. We formulate six competing theories of cooperation in Centipede g...
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متن کاملRationality and Backward Induction in Centipede Games
Author Note Andrew M. Colman, Eva M. Krockow, Caren Frosch, and Briony D. Pulford, School of Psychology, University of Leicester. We are grateful to the Leicester Judgment and Decision Making Endowment Fund (Grant RM43G0176) for support in the preparation of this chapter. Correspondence concerning this chapter should be addressed to Andrew M. Colman, School of Psychology, University of Leiceste...
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Backward induction is the most widely accepted principle for predicting behavior in dynamic games. In experiments, however, players frequently violate this principle. An alternative is a 2-parameter “dynamic level-k” model, where players choose a rule from a rule hierarchy. The rule hierarchy is iteratively defined such that the level-k rule is a best-response to the level-(k − 1) rule and the ...
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