Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining with Partition-Based Selection of Proposers∗

This paper presents a noncooperative dynamic n-player coalitional bargaining game with transferable utilities, which includes Chatterjee et al.’s (1993) fixed-order-proposer model and Okada’s (1996) random-proposer model as two extreme special cases. In this model, proposers are selected by protocols based on partitions of player sets. This paper provides conditions for the subgame efficiency, which means that the grand coalition is formed and no delay occurs in every subgame, both with discount factor δ < 1 and in the limit δ → 1. It is shown that for any discount factor δ < 1, the subgame efficiency is more difficultly achieved in a game with finer partitions, and in the limit δ → 1, the fineness of partitions does not matter for the subgame efficiency.