No Free Lunch

Some philosophers (see (Armstrong, 1997), (Cameron, 2008), (Melia, 2005), and (Schaffer, 2007, 2009, 2010a)) have recently suggested that explanations of a certain sort can mitigate our ontological commitments. The explanations in question, grounding explanations, are those that tell us what it is in virtue of which an entity exists and has the features it does. These philosophers claim that the existence and qualitative properties (call these features) of some entities can be given a grounding explanation solely by reference to the existence and properties of other things. Call an entity derivative iff its existence and other features can all be explained solely by reference to the existence and properties of other things. These philosophers argue that derivative entities are “no addition to being,” in the sense that an ontology is no less sparse for containing them than it is for containing the entities which ground them; derivative entities are an “ontological free lunch.” Grounding explanations are exemplified by certain familiar scientific explanations, and are often marked by the locution “in virtue of”. (In what follows, my use of “explain,” “because,” and cognate notions is artificially restricted to this kind of explanation.) A given isotope of gold has a certain atomic mass in virtue of containing a certain number of protons and neutrons. Ethanol is miscible in water in virtue of containing a hydroxide group. Diamond is hard because each carbon atom in its crystalline structure is bonded to each of its neighbors. 1Here and generally throughout I use “properties” to stand in for both properties and relations. 2One striking feature of these authors’ views that is not represented my exposition is that they have been developed in the pursuit of Armstrong-style truthmaker metaphysics. Here I assume that truth-making incurs an explanatory commitment, following, e.g., (Cameron, 2010, p. 257) and (Schnieder, 2006). I also put the view in the material mode, as a view about what explains certain facts, rather than a view about what makes certain truths concerning those facts true. In this I follow (Lewis, 2001).