A comparison of CEO pay–performance sensitivity in privately-held and public firms☆

نویسندگان

  • Huasheng Gao
  • Kai Li
چکیده

☆ We thank the Editor Stuart Gillan, an anonymous refe Kecskés,Mike Lemmon, Bingxuan Lin, PaulMalatesta, Ern Zhang, and seminar participants at ConcordiaUniversity,H Singapore, Peking University, Shanghai Advanced Institu of International Business and Economics, University of N Xiamen University, and conference participants at the ESE national Conference in Finance (Wuhan), the Northern Fi Finance AssociationMeetings (Philadelphia) for helpful c is the recipient of the Best Paper Award at the 2011 China Academic Research Fund Tier 1 (Reference Number: RG Canada (435-2013-0023). All errors are our own. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (H. Gao), kai.li@ 1 Tel.: +1 65 6790 4653. 2 Tel.: +1 604 822.8353.

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تاریخ انتشار 2015