Dispositional essentialism and the necessity of laws
نویسندگان
چکیده
D. J. Chalmers, 406–421. New York: Oxford University Press. Rosenthal, D.M. 2002b. Persons, minds, and consciousness. In The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene, eds R.E. Auxier and L.E. Hahn, 199–220. Chicago, Illinois: Open Court. Rosenthal, D.M. 2004. Being conscious of ourselves. The Monist 87: 161–84. Rosenthal, D.M. 2005. Consciousness and Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Shoemaker, S. 1968. Self–reference and self–awareness. The Journal of Philosophy 65: 555–67. Vallar, G. and R. Ronchi. 2009. Somatoparaphrenia: a body delusion. A review of the neuropsychological literature. Experimental Brain Research 192: 533–51. Wilkes, K.V. 1993. Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Monistic Dispositional Essentialism
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