On the invariance of sequential equilibrium and quasi-perfect equilibrium under isomorphism of extensive games
نویسنده
چکیده
Sequential equilibrium and quasi-perfect equilibrium are not invariant under isomorphism of the standard form. We introduce two relaxations of super weak isomorphism which reflect those features of extensive games which determine sequential equilibrium or quasiperfect equilibrium, respectively. Though these concepts rely on details of the extensive form, they are essentially weaker than other such concepts as strong, weak, and super weak isomorphism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
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تاریخ انتشار 2008