“Detecting Man in the Middle Attacks on Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman without Relying on a Public Key Infrastructure in Real-Time Communications”
نویسنده
چکیده
With the recent revelations about pervasive surveillance on the Internet, there is renewed interest in techniques that protect against passive eavesdropping without relying on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). An ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement can provide such protection, but (without authentication) the exchange is vulnerable to a Man in the Middle (MitM) attack. An example of a protocol that has MitM protection for a DH key agreement is ZRTP, RFC 6189, “ZRTP: Media Path Key Agreement for Unicast Secure RTP.” ZRTP provides pervasive surveillance resistant security for Voice over IP (VoIP), video communication, and other real-time communication services. This paper describes the techniques used by ZRTP to detect MitM attacks, and explores whether these techniques could be used to develop a general MitM detection protocol to be used by other non-real-time communication protocols. An example of how ZRTP can provide MitM detection for another protocol, DTLS-SRTP, Datagram Transport Layer Security – Secure Real-time Transport Protocol, is given.
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