Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider auction mechanisms for the allocation ofM items that are identical to each other except for the fact that the items have different expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. This model seems applicable in many economic situations where both items and buyers have a finite “life-time”, e.g. the allocation of transportation tickets. We are interested in situations where players act strategically and may mis-report their private parameters. We first design two auction-like mechanisms and prove that an approximatly efficient allocation is obtained for a wide class of “semi-myopic” selfish behaviors of the players. We then provide a game-theoretic rational justification for acting in such a semi-myopic way. We show that expost implementation can not be used in this case, since any such equilibria can not obtain even an approximately efficient outcome. Instead we suggest a new notion of “Set-Nash” equilibria, where we can not pin-point a single best-response strategy, but rather only a set of possible best-response strategies. These strategies are all semi-myopic and thus our auction mechanisms will perform well on any of them. We believe that this notion is of independent interest.
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تاریخ انتشار 2004