Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA

نویسندگان

  • Yan Chen
  • Kan Takeuchi
چکیده

We study two package auction mechanisms in a laboratory setting, a sealed bid Vickrey auction and an ascending version of Vickrey, the iBEA auction. Unlike the single-unit Vickrey auction, where bidders tend to overbid in the laboratory, most of our bidders either underbid or bid their true values. Furthermore, at the aggregate level, Vickrey generates significantly higher revenue and efficiency than iBEA. We also find that human bidders learn from their robot opponents when the robot strategies are (myopic) best responses.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Games and Economic Behavior

دوره 68  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2010