Electoral Competition with Local Externalities
نویسنده
چکیده
We study a simple model of public opinion formation that posits that interaction between neighbouring agents leads to bandwagons in the dynamics of individual opinion choices, as well as in that of the aggregate process. We then analyze the implication that these findings have in terms of space-time allocation of fundings in an electoral campaign, where two candidates run in a winner-take-all election.
منابع مشابه
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