Anarchy and complexity
نویسندگان
چکیده
Carlos Eduardo Maldonado has a Ph.D. in Philosophy from KULEuven (Belgium). He has been visiting professor and visiting research scholar at the University of Pittsburgh, the Catholic University of America (Washington, D.C.), and the University of Cambridge. He holds an honorary doctorate from the University of Timisoara (Romania). He is currently Research Professor at the School of Political Science and International Relations at Universidad del Rosario (Bogotá, Colombia).
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 2016