The Intentionality of Intention and Action

Cognitive Science is likely to make little progress in the study of humon behovior until we hove o clear account of what o humon action is. The aim of this paper is to present a sketch of a theory of action. I will locate the relation of intention to action within a general theory of Intentionality. I will introduce o distinction between prior intentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally selfreferential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they enable me to suggest solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, the accordian effect, basic actions, etc.), to show how the logical structure of intentional action is strikingly like the logical structure of perceptions, and to construct on account of simple actions. A successfully performed intentional action characteristically consists of an intention in action together with the bodily movement or state of the agent which is its condition of satisfaction and which is caused by it. The account is extended to complex actions. I What exactly are the relationships between the intention I had at the time of the last election to vote for Jones and the action that I performed when 1 did vote for Jones? And what exactly are the relations between these and the desire I had at the time of the last election to vote for Jones, or the belief that I had at that time that I would vote for Jones? It is quite commonly said that actions are caused by beliefs and desires, but if that is so, then what role do intentions play? On the face of it, actions would appear to be caused by intentions, and an argument for this view would be that intentions enable us to justify counterfactuals in a way