Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Majority auction games are simultaneous sealed-bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a specified fraction (more than a half) of the objects. Each bidder receives no benefit from winning less than the specified fraction and no additional benefit from winning more than it. Symmetric equilibria having simple, intuitive forms are shown to exist in firstprice, second-price and all-pay versions of such games when the number of bidders is sufficiently large. This contrasts with earlier results for the two-bidder “pure chopstick” majority auction games where the only known equilibria are more complicated. 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; D44
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 45 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003