Social Epistemology between Revisionism and Expansionism: on the Uses of “continental” Philosophy and Nenad

The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of Foucault's theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note Miščević's thoughts on the difference between analytic and continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault's dual understanding of knowledge and his placement of social epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of “new” knowledge. In opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, we are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction between “continental” and “analytic” philosophy. ! Keywords: analytic and continental philosophy, social epistemology, knowledge, revisionism, expansionism ! Part I ! Our intention is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević, dealing with social epistemology in the context of Foucault's theory of knowledge. Miščević's text is an example of a problematic, albeit entirely distinctive “use” of continental philosophy for “analytic ends.” In addition, our brief introduction to the analysis of Miščević's text is an attempt to explain the author's take on what is colloquially and ever imprecisely known as 
 31 *Received: 24.10.2014. Accepted: 19.01.2015. ! SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY BETWEEN REVISIONISM AND EXPANSIONISM: ON THE USES OF “CONTINENTAL” PHILOSOPHY AND NENAD MIŠČEVIĆ'S “DISAPPOINTMENT”* ! SNJEŽANA PRIJIĆ-SAMARŽIJA Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka ! PETAR BOJANIĆ Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade Snježana Prijić-Samaržija | Petar Bojanić continental philosophy, as well as his thematization of the difference 1 between analytic and continental philosophy. These two moves, (1) the introduction to the analysis of the text and (2) the analysis itself of the text, ought to show the place continental philosophy comprises in Miščević's philosophical endeavors. For him, continental philosophy is an introduction, leading into real analysis, that is, analytical realism (le réalisme analytique) (what does this mean for the “introduction?”). 2 Further, for Miščević, continental philosophy, ultimately, leads to disappointment and should be rejected (is it possible to reject it entirely?). In the present article we take Miščević's position or his use and application of an author usually included among continental philosophers (Michel Foucault), for the purposes of social epistemology. We then differentiate it from two other positions on the possible contemporary significance of Foucault's theories of power and knowledge for social epistemology or social ontology. The first of the two is John Searle's position as expressed in his book Making the Social World, which takes into account Foucault's theory of power and bio-power without significant revision. The second position is that of Alvin Goldman, who 3 thinks that “continental thinkers,” such as Latour or Foucault, do not significantly enrich or advance theories of social epistemology, and should therefore, for all intents and purposes, be ignored. 4 Miščević reaches the same conclusion of the insufficiency of continental philosophy, but, just like in the later writings of Searle and in contrast to 
 32 Timothy Williamson (2004, 106-107) writes about the ambiguity of who does and does 1 not belong to continental philosophy, who is and is not a continental or analytic philosopher. It seems to us that it was Williamson himself who, in a private conversation, suggested that due to problems such as this, Miščević ought to write a book about the difference between continental and analytic philosophy. We second Williamson's suggestion, and would like to submit this text as our contribution to Miščević's potential future project.